Internal Reasons and the Limits of Philosophy

Authors

  • Catherine Wilson University of York

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v4i1.144

Keywords:

morality, Williams, utilitarianism, demandingness, practical reason, moral motivation, internal reasons, external reasons

Abstract

Williams's views on the importance of internal reasons and his denial that there can be reasons for an agent to do something that have no relationship to their extendible motivational set are the key to his critical view of moral theory and moral theorists. The paper offers a qualified defense of his position on both counts, noting where adjustments to it are needed.

Author Biography

Catherine Wilson, University of York

Professor of Philosophy

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Published

2016-01-24

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 1 (2016)

Section

Focus

License

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