Philosophical Inquiries

Introduction: Kripkenstein at 45

Andrea Guardo — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Introduction: Kripkenstein at 45

Rule-following and finitude

Olivia Sultanescu — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

One of the arguments put forward by Saul Kripke’s notorious meaning sceptic, who challenges the very intelligibility of the notion of meaning, draws on the idea of finitude. The role of the finitude argument in the broader dialectic is that of undermining dispositionalist approaches to meaning. My aim in this paper is not to adjudicate the effectiveness of this attack, an effectiveness that I take to have been convincingly established, but to clarify the conception of our finitude on which the argument relies, and to investigate the nature of the constraint it imposes on views of meaning beyond dispositionalist approaches. I believe that the force of Kripke’s remarks about finitude made in the context of the argument have a more universal purport than has been recognized. They supply the materials for a way of thinking about what it is to have a finite mind, and thus for a better understanding of the kinds of creatures that we are, and the kind of phenomenon meaning is.

What Is It to Follow a Rule?

Ásgeir Berg Matthíasson — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

What is it for an agent to follow a rule, rather than merely act in accordance with

it? An intuitive and plausible answer to this question is that to follow a rule is to

perform an intentional act such that S follows a rule R iff S intends to act in accor-

dance with R and subsequently acts on that intention. This intentional account

of rule-following faces essentially two sets of problems: (1) Kripkean sceptical ar-

guments, originally derived from Wittgenstein, suggesting that the requirements

of a rule outstrip the possible content of our intention, and (2) a regress argument

due Boghossian, namely that the intentional view requires the agent to represent

the conditional content of the rule in such a way that an inferential step is required

from the antecedent to the consequent, which, given some plausible assumptions

about inference, leads to a regress.

In this paper, I will defend the intentional view of rule-following, using a

game-theoretic account of semantic content outlined in AUTHOR and AUTHOR.

I will argue that by placing the agent in the basic constitutive practice of using the

terms that figure in an expression of the rule, we can give an answer to (1). Like-

wise, by positing that the agents have an in-built mental mechanism which is such

that it responds to the constitutive structure of the content being represented (see

Quilty- Dunn and Mandelbaum 2018) and by placing the resulting movement of

thought in a basic constitutive practice of inferring, we can avoid Boghossian’s

regress.

Getting the phenomenology of "rule-following" right

Jody Azzouni — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following puzzle characterizes the phenomenology of rule-following in a specific way that has been extremely influential. It is claimed in this paper that the specifics of the puzzle, in particular, the prominent role that “normativity” plays in Kripke’s interpretation and in the subsequent literature turns on a misdescription of the human experience of rule following. In particular, the experience is distorted by projecting back into the experience of arithmetical calculation and language use how rules are experienced when these skills are first learnt as opposed to later when an agent has mastered them. There is also a sharp distinction between cognizing, when one exercises one’s knowledge skills, and metacognizing, when one think about those skills and what is involved in them. When the experience of “rule following” is recalibrated to take account of these differences, avenues to other solutions to the puzzle become available.

A Sceptical Paradox for Computational Artefacts

Chiara Manganini — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

By analogy with Kripke’s claim that no fact of the matter can determine the meaning of a word, the sceptical paradox of implementation is an argument to the conclusion that no fact of the matter can determine the function of a computational artefact. The paradox targets the prevailing view within the philosophy of computer science, according to which the function of a computational artefact is to be identified with the content of its functional specification, a mathematical object that formalises the intentions of the artefact’s designer. In existing formulations, such a view requires the existence of certain semantic intentions in the head of the designer. However, if we accept Kripke’s claim that there is no such thing as a mental state of semantic intention, this leaves ultimately indeterminate what is the function implemented by a computational artefact. Just as Kripke’s solution to the paradox requires replacing the received conception of language with a very different one, so the sceptical paradox for computational artefacts forces us to explore a new perspective on computational artefacts that, this time, does without semantic intentions.

Introduction

Leonardo Massantini — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Introduction

Ermylos Plevrakis (hrsg.), Hegels Philosophie der Realität Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2024, pp. 364, € 181,26, ISBN 978-90-04-70551-7

Benedetta Gori — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Review of: Ermylos Plevrakis (hrsg.), Hegels Philosophie der Realität, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2024, pp. 364, € 181,26, ISBN 978-90-04-70551-7

Machines that Move Us

Alessandra Fussi — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This article examines the shifting boundaries between service and social robots through the analysis of three case studies: Spot, a quadruped service robot designed for functional tasks, and two humanoid robots, Kaspar and Zeno, employed in therapeutic settings with children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The discussion highlights how Spot’s overtly mechanical appearance may reduce the likelihood of triggering the uncanny valley effect, in contrast to the more human-like features of Kaspar and Zeno. While the humanoid robots tend to elicit positive symbolic associations within therapeutic contexts, Spot’s reception varies significantly depending on its use—appearing trustworthy in industrial environments yet raising concern when deployed by police in marginalized communities. Kaspar and Zeno function as affective mediators in therapeutic interactions, though claims about their capacity to teach emotional recognition should be critically reassessed. The paper also reflects on the sociopolitical implications of weaponized robots inspired by Spot, underscoring the need to understand robotic technologies as co-constructed within broader societal and political frameworks.

Reshaping Grief with AI: What would be the Consequences of Introducing Griefbots as Supports for Bereaved People in the Mourning Process?

Irene Lenzi — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Over the past decade, the internet has seen a proliferation of AI companies promising to enable bereaved people to create griefbots of their deceased loved ones. Griefbots are generative AI conversational algorithms fine-tuned on digital remains of the deceased to imitate them. The philosophical debate about griefbots follows two main lines of thought. One sees griefbots as potential transitional objects that the grieving person can integrate into their grief process, keeping a continuing bond with the deceased. The other has raised understandable ethical concerns about these technologies. The focus of my analysis will be on the consequences of the use of griefbots on the autonomy, health and dignity of the bereaved. In section 2, I will provide a definition and comparison of the Freudian relinquishment theory and the continuing bonds perspective. In section 3, I will summarise both lines of thought about griefbots. In section 4, I will express my concerns about the use of these technologies in the grief process. First, I will explain whether griefbots can be labeled as transitional objects compared to other affective artifacts, based on Winnicott's definition of transitional objects. Secondly, I will analyse the possible risk of delusion and self-deception for mourning users when interacting with griefbots. Then, I will analyse the potential risk for the bereaved of isolation and detachment from reality in the interaction with griefbots. In the conclusions, I'll list some of the solutions that have been proposed to protect users' health and agency.

Technoethics and Situated Cognition: The Case of Exoskeletons

Leonardo Massantini, Alberto Pirni, Paolo Dario — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper offers a theoretical and ethical framework capable of describing the effects that exoskeletons (i.e., an emerging type of wearable technology) can have on users, especially on their embodiment. After the introduction, in section two we explain what exoskeletons are with a focus on occupational - or industrial - exoskeletons. We then present the major opportunities and threats that these technologies present from an ethical point of view, especially in the occupational sector. In section three we further address the ethical challenges of exoskeletons, especially whether these technologies are morally acceptable or simply individually accepted by relying on the theories of situated cognition and affectivity, which we integrate by introducing the concept of body invasion, derived from Slaby’s mind invasion. By changing the embodiment of workers, wearable technologies such as exoskeletons might impose cognitive and affective repertoires that might go against the fulfillment of goals the user would otherwise choose for herself. Finally, we show why iterative design is not enough to address the ethical challenges posed by exoskeletons especially when individual acceptance and moral acceptability are conflated.

Cavell's Perfectionism and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Paolo Babbiotti, Luca Torrente — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This article offers a rereading of the Nicomachean Ethics in light of the moral perfectionism outlined by Stanley Cavell in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome (1990) and Cities of Words (2004). In the first part, after clarifying possible misunderstandings related to the idea of “perfectionism” and presenting Cavell’s perfectionist or “Emersonian” vision, we analyze his original interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in Cities of Words. Specifically, we focus on Cavell’s commentary on Aristotle’s doctrines of happiness and friendship, which highlights the role of the philosophical style Aristotle employs throughout the work. In the second part of the article, we turn more closely to the Nicomachean Ethics itself, examining the nature of this Aristotelian treatise not only in comparison with modern works of ethics but also, and above all, in relation to Aristotle’s other treatises. In doing so, we emphasize two main aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics: the audience for whom the work is intended and its style. We conclude by examining the practical aim of this text and testing Cavell’s reading hypothesis in Cities of Words concerning the final books of the Nicomachean Ethics (8, 9, and 10).

K. Ansell-Pearson, P. Loeb, "Nietzsche’s 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra': A Critical Guide"

Andrea Inzaghi — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Review of: K. Ansell-Pearson and P. Loeb (eds.), Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022; £29.17, ISBN: 9781108855143

A Kripkensteinian Dispositionalism

Andrea Guardo — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

I argue that Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s conclusion that there is no such thing as intending a certain thing by a given word, or sentence, and hence no correctness criteria governing the use of linguistic expressions does not entail the, absurd, corollary that communication is impossible. Building on this, I also argue that we should not think about meaning in terms of correctness criteria but, rather, in terms of agreement in dispositions ‒ or, in the case of an isolated speaker, in terms of stability of dispositions. The resulting view is therefore a form of dispositionalism, but radically different from the dispositional theories already suggested in the literature on Kripkenstein’s rule-following paradox.

Philosophy and Novel Foods

Elena Bossini, Fabio Bacchini — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Introduction for the focus "Philosophy and Novel Foods"

The Morality of Creativity: Virtue and Responsibility of Creatives

Chiara Palazzolo — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Creativity is often perceived as “extra-moral” existing outside the realm of moral virtues and within aesthetics. However, creativity is also connected to ethics and extends beyond the domain of art. Many philosophers consider creativity as an intrinsically valuable character trait or virtue (Kieran, 2014; Zagzebski, 1996; Swanton, 2022). Other scholars, including Reilly and others, 2022 Qin Li, and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 emphasize the moral foundation of creativity in professions such as science and art. They argue that professional ethics, related to one's role, demonstrate how creativity significantly impacts society, particularly future generations, by shaping behavior, thought, and cultural development. Celebrations of influential individuals such as Albert Einstein, Wolfgang A. Mozart and others highlight society's respect and recognition for creativity and genius. These figures represent the pinnacle of human adaptability and success, illustrating the profound effects of creative genius on social progress (Simonton, 1994). Understanding the moral perspectives of undeniably creative individuals, both individually and collectively, further clarifies the link between world-shaping creativity and morality. In this sense, creativity can be considered not only a virtue of character but also a collective virtue, insofar as in some professional domains, creativity is employed as a collaborative enterprise. Moreover, it underscores that creative professionals possess a sense of goodness not only within their specific domain, such as orchestras and ensembles, but also towards the community they serve, reflecting a responsibility to their audience (Reilly and others 2022), thereby challenging the notion that artistic professions are exempt from moral responsibilities. Creativity can be understood as an individual or collective virtue, enabling us to learn from responsible creative subjects.

Guido Cusinato, Periagoge. Theory of Singularity and Philosophy as an Exercise of Transformation

Luca Mori — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Review of Guido Cusinato, Periagoge. Theory of Singularity and Philosophy as an Exercise of Transformation

Expanding epistemic public trust

Piero Avitabile, Alessandro Demichelis — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

This paper examines how communication between experts and lay citizens influences the development of criteria for epistemic public trust, building upon the detailed framework proposed by Irzik and Kurtulmus (2019). We first analyse the epistemic significance of trust and its implications in the public sphere. Our focus is twofold: identifying what attributes make experts trustworthy and exploring the reasons and second-order evidence that lay people can utilize to justify their trust in experts. We argue that the way experts engage in argumentation plays a crucial role: it is essential for their epistemic responsibility towards lay citizens and serves as a key indicator of their trustworthiness. Based on these considerations, we suggest an additional criterion for experts – facilitating rather than hindering the public discussion. Using an example from expert and layperson discussions during the COVID-19 pandemic, we demonstrate how this criterion can be practically applied.

Feyerabendian pluralism in practice: lessons from the Di Bella case

Luca Tambolo, Gustavo Cevolani — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

This paper contrasts two ingredients of Feyerabendian pluralism: the idea that the proliferation of theories and methods is good for science (the “limited pluralism” view) and the view of knowledge as an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives (the “oceanic” view). We argue that, in order for Feyerabendian pluralism to be tenable, the limited pluralism view should be decoupled from the oceanic one, and the latter rejected. We use as a case study that of Luigi Di Bella, an obscure Italian physician who in 1997-1998 suddenly became a national celebrity as the self-proclaimed discoverer of “the cure for cancer”. When the case erupted, no evidence of the efficacy of Di Bella’s unconventional approach to cancer treatment was available, and the relevant experts concurred that the so-called “Di Bella method” (DBM) did not show any promise. Yet, the Parliament passed a piece of ad hoc legislation authorizing a series of phase II state-funded clinical trials aimed at assessing the DBM. Asking what course of action a Feyerabendian pluralist would have recommended in this scenario allows one to probe into the – limited, as it turns out – validity of some of Feyerabend’s views on theoretical pluralism.

Feyerabend’s humanitarian pluralism and its relevance for science-based policy

Karim Bschir — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

A strong commitment to pluralism on multiple levels (methodological, theoretical, ontological as well as political) is a defining feature of Paul Feyerabend’s philosophical corpus. However, for Feyerabend, pluralism is not just an epistemologically preferable account within the philosophy of science. He also believes that pluralism is the only account of science that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook.

In the first part of this paper, I will reconstruct Feyerabend’s theoretical pluralism in the context of his criticism of Thomas Kuhn’s account. I will show that Feyerabend’s critical engagement with Kuhn’s model of scientific revolutions in the early 1960s was crucially important for the development of his own pluralistic account of science. In the second part, I will discuss and critically analyse the ethical-political stance that underlies Feyerabend’s pluralism. In the final part, I briefly summarize a series of papers that I have published together with Simon Lohse, in which we apply Feyerabend’s pluralism to current discussions about the role of evidence-based policy advice during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Wisdom, scientific expertise, and laypeople:

Pierluigi Barrotta, Roberto Gronda — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Throughout his career, Feyerabend was seriously concerned with the authoritative role claimed by experts within democratic societies. He repeatedly argued that citizens should not be intimidated by the authority of science, and they should resist any attempt to strip themselves of their right to have a say in important social matters of public concern. We do not share Feyerabend’s anarchist approach to philosophy of science; nevertheless, we believe that some aspects of his philosophy of science can easily be incorporated into a constructive philosophy of scientific expertise. The aim of this essay is to argue for two theses that we believe have an unequivocal Feyerabendian “flavour”: a) that to be a good scientific expert, the scientist must be endowed with wisdom; and b) that public opinion is not limited to setting the goals that the scientific expert should take as exogenous data. In this way, we outline a normative model of the epistemic contributions that citizens and scientific experts can make to solve public problems.

Feyerabend, experts, and dilettantes

John Preston — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Paul Feyerabend’s 1970 article “Experts in a Free Society” tries to make the case that scientific experts can only be tolerated if they are dilettantes. He uses Galileo, Newton and Kepler as examples of great scientists whose writing is nothing like that of contemporary “experts”, these latter being represented by the authors of the well-known book Human Sexual Response, Bill Masters and Virginia Johnson. He goes on to argue against the idea that the Scientific Revolution represented the triumph of empiricism.

I take issue with the way Feyerabend represents Galileo as implacably opposed to empiricism, with his supposition that good science requires a particular personality, and with the way in which he represents the work of Masters and Johnson.

Introduction: The role of experts in democratic societies: In honor of Paul K. Feyerabend

Pierluigi Barrotta, Luca Tambolo, Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Gronda — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Introduction to the Focus section of the issue XII, 1/2024

The Ontological a Priori of Truth as Freedom

Reyhan Yılmaz — Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

In this paper, I attempt to reassess Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia with a critical look at Barry Allen’s notion of “onto-logic” according to which the logical possibility of truth derives from the idea of self-ruled ontology. By dwelling on Heidegger’s conception of ontological difference and his delineation of freedom as the essence of truth, Allen accuses Heidegger of embracing the traditional onto-logic of truth and being wherein truth is associated with being, therefore, attributing self-sameness to Being, contrasting with the intricate process of becoming. Allen’s interpretation of Heidegger, however, poses certain issues when we consider the relationship between Being, Dasein, and truth as entailing and giving rise to dynamic happening. In order to argue for this point, I focus on Heidegger’s key formulation that the essence of truth is the truth of essence and his characterization of Ereignis as “appropriation.” I maintain that this way of investigation helps to portray the intrinsic relationship between concealment and unconcealment in terms of dynamic interplay, thereby dealing effectively with Allen’s limiting Heidegger’s philosophy to classical ontology.

Consciousness lived through

Filippo Nobili — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

The paper aims to examine Brentano's account of inner consciousness and to assess its reception in Husserl's early works. Starting from the preliminary definition of psychic phenomena and an overview of some basic distinctions such as those between inner perception and observation, primary and secondary object, etc., I discuss Brentano's later thoughts in the light of his theory of relation and temporality, exposing a certain inconsistency with his initial assumptions. Subsequently, I examine Husserl's critical reception of inner consciousness in the Logical Investigations (1901) and in his lectures up to 1905, that is up to the first in-depth thematization of temporality, to which inner consciousness will be inextricably related. Indeed, Husserl’s redrafting of the inherited psychologistic lexicon helps to trace a prehistory of his phenomenology of time and to better understand the paradigmatic detachment of phenomenology from descriptive psychology.

Mind invasion — From individuals to nations

Achim Stephan, Sven Walter — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper details different ways in which people’s affective life, and in consequence, their behavior is negatively influenced by how others—from individuals to nations—have structured the environment, i.e., different facets of what Jan Slaby has called “mind invasion.” We start by introducing key ideas and concepts from the debate about situated affectivity relevant for the subsequent discussion. The main part explores a wide variety of settings in which people’s minds are invaded, from rather localized offline interactions between two individuals over online interactions and Onlifeenvironments where real world interactions between some people merge with online activities to mind invasions at a national or even worldwide level.

An Ontological Guide to Make Novel Foods Familiar

Nicola Piras — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The goal of this paper is to develop strategies for novel food familiarization based on ontological modelling. I begin by offering an array of criticisms to standard definitions of novel food, focusing on the European Union (EU) approach as a case study, showing its difficulty in identifying and categorizing novel foods (§1). Next, I refine the EU approach by setting up a more robust ontological categorization suitable for assessing kinds and grades of food novelty (§2). Then, I add a further layer to this ontology outlining initial steps to incorporate novel food items within already known and accepted ontological categories (i.e., local food and symbolic food) (§3). I conclude by arguing that the decision-making process regarding novel food ontological categorization should include input from stakeholders (§4).

Is this meat after all?

Elena Bossini, Fabio Bacchini — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The supposedly shared understanding of what meat is has been undermined by the appearance of foodstuffs that claim to be meat even though they are derived from vegetable sources (plant-based meats) or are produced by cultivating animal cells in vitro (cultivated meat). After introducing the actors partaking in the negotiation over which foods can legitimately be called ‘meat’ – and demonstrating that the crux of this dispute is ontological rather than merely linguistic – the divergent concepts of “meat” that arise in this debate are analysed to elucidate their respective strengths and weaknesses. Subsequently, it is proposed that meat could be interpreted as an artefact represented by a functional concept apt at incorporating plant-based and cultivated meat into its content. Lastly, by examining this operation through the lens of conceptual engineering, the functional understanding of meat is presented as an epistemic, or even potentially semantic, amelioration of the concept of “meat”.

Cultivated Meat: A New Lifeworld for Human Beings

Luca Lo Sapio — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Several reports indicate that industrial animal agriculture significantly contributes to environmental pollution, resources depletion and the suffering of billions of animals. With the rising global demand for animal protein, partly driven by changing diets in countries like China and India, there is an increasing interest in more sustainable and humane alternatives. In this context, cultivated meat has emerged as one of the most promising food technologies for mitigating the impact of conventional meat production. In the first two paragraphs, the article briefly describes what is cultivated meat and what impact it may have on the environment and non-human animal wellbeing as well as the technical and socio-economic challenges it poses. In the third paragraph, it succinctly examines some positions from the ethical debate, with particular attention to Singer’s consequentialism and Francione’s abolitionist approach. Francione’s negative conclusions closely align with certain versions of virtue ethics. Paragraphs 4 and 5 will examine two such positions, specifically those of Carlo Alvaro and Ben Bramble, which have significantly influenced reflections in the field. In paragraph 6, contrasting the pessimistic views of Alvaro and Bramble, the article will present cultivated meat as a new opportunity for reshaping the human lifeworld. The final paragraph will discuss five key elements associated with cultivated meat and its moral implications.

Photography and social networks: a case study in situated affectivity

Giulia Piredda — Wed, 23 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In our activity on social networks, we tend to crystallize happy moments of our life that we want to share with other people. In doing so, we seem to display the best version of ourselves, and in editing our digital self, we can create an ideal self. In the traditional debate on the risks of technology, many researchers have expressed the fear that this tendency could represent a way of falsifying the reality of our selves by offering a single piece of information about our lives: one in which we are happy, satisfied with our life choices and fulfilled. This risks generating negative effects in others as it produces comparisons in which people may be left feeling dissatisfied; sometimes, especially at a certain age, it could even be dangerous to linger in comparisons of this sort (for a general discussion on these topics see Fasoli 2019; Toma 2016). But: is it really a problem – something ‘bad’ – that we tend to publish our positive moments?

In this paper I would like to offer a different interpretation of this phenomenon, framing it within the terms of two recent philosophical debates and showing that there is another more innocent, and perhaps naïve, interpretation of this tendency, which has to do with the question: for whom do we post pictures? Who is the recipient of our posts on social networks?

I will discuss these questions by framing them within the context of the debate on situated affectivity (Griffiths & Scarantino 2009; Colombetti & Krueger 2015), and exploring the interpretation of posts on social networks as potential examples of affective artifacts (Piredda 2020). Moreover, posts on social networks may be interpreted within the discussion of the extended/distributed self as pieces of our extended selves (Belk 2013; Candiotto, Piredda 2019; Heersmink 2017). Taking a first-person perspective on this problem changes the evaluation of this phenomenon and highlights the role of photography in structuring our life-narrative – a role it played even before the arrival of social networks.

Cultured meat in between Anthropocene crises

Alice Dal Gobbo — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Cultured meat is an emerging food technology that promises to revolutionise not only meat production techniques but also the relations between human beings and other animals, and the rest of the biosphere. Cultured meat might be read as a food innovation for the Anthropocene, since it addresses ecological, health and inter-species issues that characterise this historical phase and its problematisation. I propose a reading of the potentiality and pitfalls of this emerging technology based on a perspective of political ecology, which I believe fundamental in highlighting the social shaping of innovation and its embeddedness in wider symbolic and material dynamics shaped by power. In particular, I engage with feminist debates over science, technology, inter-species relations and the issue of ecological crisis to put into light the highly ambivalent nature of this “hybrid” object. Given this complexity, I argue for a methodological approach to technoscience innovation and the shaping of future food imaginaries that draws on processes of mapping to stay close to marginal, unrepresented, and yet politically crucial voices.