Philosophical Inquiries <div><p><em>Philosophical Inquiries</em> is an Italian philosophical journal published in English. Its aim is to cover a wide range of philosophical questions of broad interest and belonging to diverse fields, such as epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of law. It seeks to bring together international scholars committed to cutting edge research on pressing questions in those fields. <br />Needless to say, the submission system in use on this website is a strict double-blind peer-review process.</p></div> en-US Philosophical Inquiries 2281-8618 <p>Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication, with the work five (5) years after publication licensed under a <a href="" target="_new">Creative Commons Attribution License</a> that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.</p> <p>After five years from first publication, Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial publication in this journal.</p> <em>Manipulated Agents. A Window to Moral Responsibility</em>, by Alfred R. Mele <p>Review of Alfred R. Mele, <em>Manipulated Agents. A Window to Moral Responsibility</em>, Oxford University Press, New York 2019, 174 pages</p> Lorenzo Testa Copyright (c) 2021 2021-09-01 2021-09-01 9 2 R1 R5 <em>The Tyranny of Merit. What’s Become of the Common Good?</em> by Michael J. Sandel <p>Review of Michael J. Sandel, <em>The Tyranny of Merit. What’s Become of the Common Good?</em>, Penguin Random House, London 2020, 270 pages</p> Giulia Balossino Copyright (c) 2021 2021-09-01 2021-09-01 9 2 R6 R10 Ethics, a matter of style? <p>First published in Bernard Williams, <em>L’éthique et les limites de la philosophie</em> [1985], trans. Marie-Anne Lescourret, Editions Gallimard, NRF Essais, Paris 1990, pp. V-XIX. The present edition of this Introduction has been supplemented by a number of footnotes. They have been added by Paolo Babbiotti, Nikhil Krishnan and Mathis Marquier, the authors of “Commentary to B. Williams’s French Introduction to Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy”, published in Philosophical Inquiries, IX, 2-2021: 259-268.</p> Bernard Williams Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-09-08 2021-09-08 9 2 269 284 Commentary to B. Williams’s French Introduction to "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy" <p>The English original of Bernard Williams’s <em>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</em> was published in 1985. Since its publication, it has provoked a substantial body of philosophical commentary, sympathetic as well as critical. Williams’s introduction to the 1990 French translation of <em>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</em> is an unusual text and an illuminating new source for readers of Williams. Refreshingly, it reflects an effort on Williams’s part to establish a connection with a new set of readers. It is also the work of a philosopher relishing the freedoms that come from not having to connect with the old one. Does his introduction itself benefit from a further introduction? We believe that it does, and for the same reason that the book needed some prefatory words before it could be put into the hands of French readers: because the work is not, or no longer, fully self-explanatory.</p> Paolo Babbiotti Nikhil Krishnan Mathis Marquier Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-09-08 2021-09-08 9 2 259 268 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.377 Introduction <p>This is an introduction to the Focus "Art, and especially contemporary art, is often fueled by a need for innovation. Accordingly, the philosophy of art has no shortage of novel topics to address. Furthermore, just like in other areas of philosophical debate, reconsidering less-discussed views on the arts can be a refreshing exercise. Additionally, contemporary reflection on the arts and on aesthetic experience is facing new challenges, stemming from the impact of climate change on the natural and the urban landscape, from the pressing need for intercultural dialogue, and from the acknowledgment of cultural identities related to gender, race, and class. All the authors who successfully responded to our call for papers for the Focus “Philosophy of Art: New Directions” are concerned with the abovementioned issues. The collection, stemming as it does from a call for papers, has no ambition to exhaustiveness, and yet it seems to us that it covers quite a wide range of topics. A variety of research styles is also represented, the only common denominator being the quality of the proposals, in terms of originality, relevance, and argumentative force.of Art: New Directions".</p> Elisa Caldarola Jerrold Levinson Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 65 68 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.370 On tags and conceptual street art <p>The starting point of this paper is two views. On the one hand, two general claims about street art: first, that all works of street art are subversive (see, e.g., Bacharach 2015; 2018; Chackal 2016; Baldini 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; Willard 2016), second, that works of street art are the result of acts of self-expression (Riggle 2016). On the other hand, a much more specific view about certain contemporary tags produced, roughly, over the past twenty years: those tags are artworks, even though they are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of aesthetic properties grounded in their perceptual properties, because they are works of conceptual street art (see Lewisohn 2010; JAK 2012). The key question of the paper concerns “very early tags” (VETs) – the extremely simple, unadorned tags that first appeared in the late 1960s and that some scholars consider as the historical predecessors of the various practices that today we group under the category “street art” (see, e.g., Young 2014; Gastman et al. 2015): should we regard VETs as artworks? On the one hand, VETs writers tend to answer this question in the negative. On the other hand, already in the early 1970s, artists and intellectuals such as Norman Mailer and Gordon Matta-Clark seemed to believe that it was appropriate to regard both VETs and later tags as art, although they didn’t defend this claim with argument. The view that some contemporary tags that are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of their aesthetic properties might be candidates for appreciation as works of conceptual art suggests a strategy for assessing the issue of whether VETs are candidates for art appreciation: can we defend the claim that the extremely simple, unadorned VETs were presented for appreciation as works of conceptual street art? I argue that we have good reasons to hold this view.</p> Elisa Caldarola Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 89 110 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.368 “Who inspires who?” Aesthetics in front of AI art <p>AI art certainly belongs among the most under-researched art forms of today. While the ethical aspects of AI are often discussed, its implications for aesthetics are rarely considered. The reason is perhaps that the ability of AI to produce art is a very recent development. Artificial intelligence is becoming more and more important nowadays due to the many changes it has made in our lives. In this context, one of the most surprising fields in which AI has suddenly progressed in the last few years concerns the very human (until now) capacity for artistic (and in a more general sense, aesthetic) expression. However, the general public still tends to confuse AI art with the more general category of digital art, and what AI really does in the artistic field is scarcely known. AI art is not only computer assisted but computer generated. In AI art there is at least one part of the artistic process that is left to the machine. The artist gives the AI some data and has to wait, in order to see how the AI will elaborate upon them. AI, therefore, becomes not just a <em>tool</em> for artists, but also something different, the nature of which needs to be explored. What does AI art have to say about our way of seeing art, and perhaps about our way of seeing the world in general? This will be the leading question of this paper, which will be addressed through the analysis of some relevant aspects of this new kind of art.</p> Alice Barale Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 195 220 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.367 <em>Of Immediate Apperception</em>, by Maine de Biran <p>Review of Maine de Biran, <em>Of Immediate Apperception</em>, edited by A. Aloisi, M. Piazza and M. Sinclair, Bloomsbury, London-New York 2020, 184 pages.</p> Denise Vincenti Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 R5 R8 <em>Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers</em>, by Cheryl Misak <p>Review of Cheryl Misak, <em>Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers</em>, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, 500 pages</p> Brent C. Odland Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 R1 R4 The dialogical philosophy <p>This essay points out the necessity of evoking several philosophical systems in order to realize the evolution of the scientific theory of knowledge in modern physics. It proposes a sort of spectrum of philosophical systems with seven conceptions set in the following order : realism, empiricism, positivism, rationalism, formalism, conventionalism, idealism. A double filiation unites these philosophies in the center of the spectrum, so that, rationalism, in conjunction with technical materialism, seems to be the most strongly established philosophy, and the backbone of modern scientific thought. Rationalism, far from representing a detached point of view, appears as a dialectical philosophy as soon as it seeks its confirmation in technical experience.</p> Gaston Bachelard Gennaro Lauro Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 231 240 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.363 A dialogical philosophy: Bachelard’s “Introduction” to “Le Rationalisme appliqué” <p>The translation in the following essay of this issue of <em>Philosophical inquiries</em> makes available a preliminary version of what would become the introduction to <em>Le Rationalisme appliqué</em> (Bachelard 1949). We can regard it as a first step towards making <em>Le Rationalisme appliqué</em> accessible to the English readers, hoping that it may lead to a translation of the entire work.</p> <p>The introduction to <em>Le Rationalisme appliqué</em> can be regarded as one of the most canonical expositions of Bachelard’s philosophy of science. It echoes the introductions and conclusions of each of his epistemological works since <em>The New Scientific Spirit</em>, in a series of small philosophical treatises that offer a remarkable continuity.</p> Lucie Fabry Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 211 230 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.362 Introduction. Ian Hacking and the Historical Reason of the Sciences <p>Ian Hacking is among the few that have successfully undermined the Analytic/Continental divide, by working on the “trading zones” between these two strands, and forged their conceptual instruments by drawing these latter from different sources and applying them to widely diverse philosophical debates, across natural, social and medical sciences: debates ranging from the problem of induction and proofs and deduction in mathematics to the theories of meaning and truth as well as to the controversy between realism and constructivism in natural and social sciences.</p> <p>Albeit well-known and widely inspiring, Hacking is still rarely studied, and his wide-ranging production has not yet received an accurate and comprehensive analysis. This Focus aims to precisely fill this gap, by providing one of the first extensive studies dedicated to Hacking’s philosophy. It does not wish, however, to cover all the philosophical areas to which he has possibly contributed, neither does it aim, more generally, to provide a commentary nor an exegesis of his works. By collecting papers by both established and young scholars, this Focus rather intends to explore why Hacking has so largely in- fluenced the field of history and philosophy of science. Analyzing Hacking’s contribution to the 20th-century attempts to bring together history and philosophy of science as well as discussing his arguments on scientific stability, the Focus tackles, from different perspectives, the question of the historicity of reason. Without aspiring to definitive answers, this Focus wishes to open up lines of further research on Hacking’s works as well as along their path.</p> Matteo Vagelli Marica Setaro Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 115 120 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.361 Introduction. Paolo Parrini & relative a priori principles <p>Paolo Parrini devoted concerted philosophical attention to theoretical phi- losophy, re-examining core issues in epistemology, philosophy of language and history and philosophy of science, not only for their intrinsic philosophical interest, but also for their cultural significance. This pair of papers published here in English he himself affiliated closely. “Analyticity and Epistemological Holism: Prague Alternatives” appeared originally in Italian in 2006; “Quine on Analyticity and Holism. A critical appraisal in dialogue with Sandro Nannini,” in 2018. He translated both into English early in 2020, posting their original Italian together with their new English versions on his own website. Doubtless both are related to his research interests in Herbart’s conceptual Bearbeitung, which surely must be a vigorous form of conceptual explication. Most unfortunately, Paolo was taken from us suddenly, unexpectedly, at the start of July (2020). What more we can learn from him, we shall learn from his considerable published accomplishments. This brief Introduction seeks to epitomize the core issues and significance of this pair of papers, in tribute to him and his very substantial philosophical achievements.</p> Kenneth R. Westphal Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 59 78 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.360 Quine on Analyticity and Holism <p>The first four sections evaluate Quine’s thesis that the two dogmas of empiricism (analyticity and reductionism) are at root identical. In particular, a full compatibility is developed and defended between epistemological, anti-reductionist holism and both the analytic/synthetic and <em>a priori/a posteriori</em> distinctions. According to the view defended here, understanding the relations between theory and experience requires not the rejection of such distinctions, but rather their relativization. In the fifth and final section, the importance of such distinctions is shown regarding epistemological analysis and discussions of the relations between science and philosophy.</p> Kenneth R. Westphal Paolo Parrini Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 95 112 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.359 Analyticity and Epistemological Holism: Prague alternatives <p>In the early 1930’s Carnap and Quine met in Prague and discussed logic and philosophy. Carnap was working on the <em>Logische Syntax der Sprache</em>; when Quine went back to Harvard he published “Truth by Convention.” The purpose of the present paper is to establish three main points: (1) in “Truth by Convention” some important aspects of the future position Quine will assume about the analytic/synthetic and the <em>a priori/a posteriori</em> dichotomies are already expressed; (2) in the <em>Logische Syntax der Sprache</em>, Carnap maintains the distinction between L-rules and P-rules, at the same time being aware of the holistic character of empirical control and of the possibility to revise the acceptance of every kind of sentences; (3) Quine’s idea that the holistic conception requires completely abandoning the analytic/synthetic and <em>a priori/a posteriori</em> distinctions does not seem wholly correct. On the contrary, in the <em>Logische Syntax</em> Carnap takes a step forward in his conception of the “relativized <em>a priori</em>”. Thus, we can say that in the Prague years two alternative accounts of the theory/experience relation began to emerge. These two alternatives are still pivotal in the contemporary epistemological debate.</p> Kenneth R. Westphal Paolo Parrini Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 79 94 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.358 Understanding stability in cognitive neuroscience through Hacking's lens <p>Ian Hacking instigated a revolution in 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy of science by putting experiments (“interventions”) at the top of a philosophical agenda that historically had focused nearly exclusively on representations (“theories”). In this paper, I focus on a set of conceptual tools Hacking (1992) put forward to understand how laboratory sciences become stable and to explain what such stability meant for the prospects of unity of science and kind discovery in experimental science. I first use Hacking’s tools to understand sources of instability and disunity in rodent behavioral neuroscience. I then use them to understand recent grass-roots collaborative initiatives aimed at establishing stability in this research area and tease out some implications for unity of science and kind creation and discovery in cognitive neuroscience.</p> Jacqueline Sullivan Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 189 208 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.346 On Fraudulence in Art Contemporary art is frequently accused to be fraudulent. Usually explained away as an epiphenomenon, the experience of fraudulence is rarely investigated <em>per se</em>. This paper closely examines Stanley Cavell’s stance on the issue, comparing it with the positions implied in Arthur Danto’s, Nelson Goodman’s and Richard Wollheim’s aesthetics. Reflections on examples of fraudulent art in the history of visual art lead to partly dismiss Cavell’s position in his own term: fraudulent art can be part of the media resources which might allow an artist to “keep faith with tradition.” The impression of fraudulence is then dependent on the ontology of contemporary artworks. Andrea Maistrello Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 69 88 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.345 Intergenerational aesthetics This article introduces the philosophical sub-specialty of intergenerational aesthetics, which centers in the study of aesthetic values and aesthetic choices taking into account the aesthetic appreciation of future generations. Acknowledging a temporal dependency between the present and the future in aesthetics offers a new perspective to explore aesthetic values, perception, and judgments as well as practical aesthetic decisions. This essay discusses the main concerns of intergenerational aesthetics, including its theoretical stakes, its disciplinary and interdisciplinary influences, its normative aspect, the role of intergenerational thinking in theory and practice, and presents a specific case to illustrate the pressing importance of introducing intergenerational considerations to our current aesthetic practices. It also proposes a series of potential avenues of research for further investigations in the field. Remei Capdevila-Werning Sanna Lehtinen Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 171 194 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.343 Naturalism, pragmatism and historical epistemology <div id="titleAndAbstract"><table class="data" width="100%"><tbody><tr valign="top"><td class="value"><p>Historical Epistemology is a discipline that draws on quite distinct sources, straddling the analytic-continental divide within the history and philosophy of science. In this paper, I examine the analytic side of the equation, namely the tradition of empiricist naturalism, and the emergence, within the work of Goodman, Kuhn and Hacking, of naturalized transcendental structures resembling Wittgensteinian language-games, and the correlated multiplication of “worlds”.</p></td></tr></tbody></table></div><div id="indexing"> </div> David Hyder Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 121 144 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.342 Environmental integralism: New prospects for the ontology, the aesthetics, and the ethics of architectural works This contribution aims to explore a certain ontological approach to architectural works called ‘environmental integralism’, according to which the architectural work does not run out in the building, but includes at least part of the environment in which the building is located. Social context is also relevant in order to assess its functional and its aesthetic values. Not only that, environmental integralism may be understood as a form of paving the way for developing an ethical approach to architecture. In this sense, this talk tries to focus on the social and environmental role in architectural appreciation. This should be understood as showing how ontological debates may have an influence on aesthetic as well as on ethical considerations. Xavier de Donato Rodriguez Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 133 152 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.341 Were experiments ever neglected? Ian Hacking and the history of the philosophy of experiments <p dir="ltr"><span>Ian Hacking’s </span><span>Representing and Intervening </span><span>(1983) is often credited to be one of the first works that focused on the role of experimentation in philosophy of science, initiating a movement which is sometimes called the “philosophy of experiment” (Hacking, 1988) or “new experimentalism” (Ackermann, 1989). Moreover, in the 1980s, a number of other movements and scholars also started to focus on the role of experimentation and instruments in science, ranging from science studies (Pickering, 1984; Shapin &amp; Schaffer, 1985; Latour, 1987), Hans Radder (1984) and postphenomenology (Ihde, 1979). A philosophical study of experiments seems thus to be an invention of the 1980s, with Hacking being one of its central figures.</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span>This article aims to assess this historical claim by Hacking and others. First of all, from a broader perspective on the history of philosophy, this invention narrative is incorrect, since experiment has been a topic for philosophers before, ranging from Ernst Mach (1905), Pierre Duhem (1906), Hugo Dingler (1928) to Gaston Bachelard (1934). Secondly, also a possible reassessment of this historical claim in the form of a rediscovery narrative, where Hacking and others merely rediscovered the work of these earlier authors is also problematized. The conclusion, nonetheless, is not that Hacking made no relevant contribution whatsoever to the philosophy of experiment nor that the hype around experiments in the 1980s should be dismissed as historically uninformed. Rather, it leads to a reevaluation of how to assess the history of the philosophy of experiment and Hacking’s position in it.</span></p><span id="docs-internal-guid-e638ec09-7fff-4587-8c70-bd4a7a7d1eef"><span>Instead of looking at experimentation as a fixed research object that is either present or not in the work of specific authors, such an essentialist thesis about experiments should be abandoned in favour of a contextualist narrative that rather asks the questions </span><span>in what way </span><span>experimentation becomes a philosophical problem for certain authors and </span><span>for what purpose. </span><span>This also enables us to resituate Hacking’s philosophy of experiment, which should not be evaluated solely on the fact whether he was the first to talk about experiments or not, but rather in relation to the specific debates in which he was intervening with these claims. Hacking’s claims, such as his experimental argument for the reality of theoretical entities, therefore, will be situated within his debates with the sociology of science (Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1985), Bruno Latour’s constructivism (Latour, 1987; 1999) and the Science Wars (Hacking, 1999).</span></span> Massimiliano Simons Matteo Vagelli Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 167 188 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.339 On the Way to a Cross-Cultural Thought: Steps between European and Sino-Japanese Aesthetics <p style="text-indent: 0.5cm; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="JUSTIFY"><span style="font-size: small;"><span lang="en">The article focuses on some aesthetic issues in an intercultural perspective. The confrontation with a context of thought that developed outside the Western influence for centuries, such as the Sino-japanese one, allows to discuss and intertwine some notions, experiences and arguments, in order to provide a possible mutual understanding and self-reflection among different cultures through aesthetics and artistic experience. In particular, the notions of “image” and “body”, traditionally relevant in Western aesthetics, are presented as thought-provoking in a cross-cultural “fusion of horizon”. So, a de-coincidence with the European atavic categories and their “unthought” can be promoted and enhanced, thus providing new prespectives and non-eurocentric views.</span></span></p> Marcello Ghilardi Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 153 170 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.331 Chronopolitics in a minor key: Afrofuturism and social death In this article, I map some of the philosophical implications of that collection of aesthetic practices grouped under the moniker of "Afrofuturism" since Mark Dery's first deployment of the term in 1993. In so doing, I advance several (inter)related theses. First, that aesthetic philosophy should look to Afrofuturism for a model of emancipatory political art, such as it supposes lost with the high modernism of the 20th century. Second, that an engagement with the culturally and commerically immanent modes of Afrofuturist production will help to realise Benjamin's dream, of an aesthetic philosophy no longer dedicated to the "aura" of bourgeois art objects. And finally, following Deleuze and Guattari, I claim that Afrofuturism opens up the space for reflection on a "minoritarian" politics, such as might replace traditional Marxist accounts of class antagonism and help us to reconceive the "resistance" so sorely needed today. Timothy Deane-Freeman Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 221 238 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.325 Sonic obstacles and conceptual nostalgia: preliminary considerations on musical conceptualism and contemporary art <p>This paper is concerned with the aesthetic and discursive gap between music and contemporary art, and the recent attempts to remedy this in the field of New Music through a notion of “New Conceptualism.” It examines why, despite musical sources being central to the emergence of conceptual artistic strategies in the 1950s and “60s, the worlds of an increasingly transmedial “generic art” and music have remained largely distinct. While it takes New Music’s New Conceptualism as its focus, it argues that the perspective on New Music it takes has wider implications in music and art. It begins by defining what exactly “New Music” refers to, and outlines some of the conditions for the recent rise of conceptualism in New Music. It then takes the work of the composer Johannes Kreidler as a key example of some artistic tendencies and theoretical presuppositions in New Conceptualism. Following this it draws on work in the field of sound studies in order to critically examine the theoretical attempt to connect New Music with contemporary art that is found in the notion of “Music in the Expanded Field.” To conclude it offers some reflections on how a more robust conversation between contemporary art and New Music can begin to be conceived.</p> Iain Campbell Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 9 2 111 132 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.324 Ian Hacking's metahistory of science <p>In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and philosophy of science in Ian Hacking’s styles of scientific reasoning project. In our analysis, we employ a distinction between “historical <em>philosophy </em>of science” and “philosophical <em>history </em>of science”: the former aims at addressing philosophical issues, while the latter aims at telling stories about the scientific past that are informed by philosophical considerations. We argue that Hacking practices historical <em>philosophy</em> of science; discuss how his approach is differentiated from the so-called confrontation model; and show that he opts for a strong integration between history and philosophy of science. Finally, we discuss the historiographical implications of his approach and suggest that his aim at maintaining a middle position, on the one hand, between contingency and inevitabilism, and, on the other, between internalism and externalism in the explanation of the stability of scientific knowledge, is compromised by his philosophical commitments.</p> Manolis Simos Theodore Arabatzis Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 9 2 145 166 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.314 Robert Brandom, <em>A Spirit of Trust</em> Review of Robert Brandom, <em>A Spirit of Trust.A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology</em>, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2019, 856 pages. Gilles Bouché Copyright (c) 2020 Philosophical Inquiries 2020-07-20 2020-07-20 9 2 R6 R13 Peter Adamson "<em>Medieval Philosophy. A history of philosophy without any gaps</em>" Review of Peter Adamson <em>Medieval Philosophy. A history of philosophy without any gaps</em>, volume 4, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019, 688 pages. Fabrizio Amerini Copyright (c) 2020 Philosophical Inquiries 2020-07-20 2020-07-20 9 2 R1 R5 Note on Hegel and Heidegger Review (1936) to A. Delp, <em>Tragische Existenz</em>, in <em>Recherches philosophiques</em>, V, 1935-1936: 415‑419; first English translation by Gennaro Lauro, edited by Marco Filoni; a very special thanks to Nina Kousnetzoff, who granted us permission to translate and publish Kojève’s essay. Alexandre Kojève Copyright (c) 2020 Philosophical Inquiries 2020-07-20 2020-07-20 9 2 209 220 10.4454/philinq.v8i2.308 “Man is action, not being” Hegel contra Heidegger in an unpublished essay by Kojève Introduction to Past present. Abstract not available. Marco Filoni Copyright (c) 2020 Philosophical Inquiries 2020-07-20 2020-07-20 9 2 203 208 10.4454/philinq.v8i2.307 Expertise that matters. On Dewey’s understanding of relevant science Expertise is much contested in modern democracies. In this article I shall investigate whether Dewey’s understanding of science and expertise provides us with some answers about the interplay between science, the public and society. Decisive for Dewey’s vision of the relation of democracy and science is that epistemic qualities and what he calls “organized intelligence” should contribute to find the best solutions for human wellbeing and growth. Science and expertise that can live up to this purpose are relevant from a pragmatic viewpoint. I shall suggest a reading of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim as a test for relevance that can be used to conceptualize a pragmatic version of science and expertise in the public interest.<br /><br /> Antje Gimmler Copyright (c) 2020 Philosophical Inquiries 2020-07-20 2020-07-20 9 2 177 200 10.4454/philinq.v8i2.306