Philosophical Inquiries <div> <p><em>Philosophical Inquiries</em> is an Italian philosophical journal published in English. Its aim is to cover a wide range of philosophical questions of broad interest and belonging to diverse fields, such as epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of law. It seeks to bring together international scholars committed to cutting edge research on pressing questions in those fields. <br />Needless to say, the submission system in use on this website is a strict double-blind peer-review process.</p> <p>Indexed in: <a href="" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Scopus</a>, Philosopher's Index, Fascia A Anvur (11/C1, C2, C3, C4, C5).</p> </div> en-US Philosophical Inquiries 2281-8618 <p>Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication, with the work five (5) years after publication licensed under a <a href="" target="_new">Creative Commons Attribution License</a> that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.</p> <p>After five years from first publication, Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial publication in this journal.</p> Quasi-analysis <p>First English translation of R. Carnap’s “Die Quasizerlegung”.</p> <p>The unpublished manuscript is preserved at the Archives of Scientific Philosophy (ASP), Hillman Library, Carnap papers, University of Pittsburgh (RC-081-04-01).</p> Rudolf Carnap Caterina Del Sordo Thomas Mormann Copyright (c) 2022 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 255 271 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.404 <em>Logical Form: Between Logic and Natural Language</em>, by Andrea Iacona <p>Book review of Andrea Iacona, <em>Logical Form: Between Logic and Natural Language</em>, Springer, 2018, 133 pages</p> Giuliano Rosella Copyright (c) 2022 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 R7 R13 <em>Ontology without Borders</em>, by Jody Azzouni <p>Review of Jody Azzouni, <em>Ontology without Borders</em>, Oxford University Press, New York 2017, 279 pages.</p> Delia Belleri Copyright (c) 2022 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 R1 R6 The significance of Quasizerlegung for Carnap’s Aufbau and scientific philosophy in general <p>In this introduction to the first English translation of Carnap's <em>Quasizerlegung</em>, we summarize the history of its reception and its role as groundwork for Carnap's <em>Der logische Aufbau der Welt</em> (The logical structure of the World). We aim to stress the philosophical significance of the <em>Quasizerlegung</em> as a prototype of mathematical philosophy by uncovering the many points of convergence between the philosophical and mathematical enterprises of neutral monism and representations.</p> Caterina Del Sordo Thomas Mormann Copyright (c) 2022 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 231 253 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.401 Introduction <p>In this introduction, we explain the origin, the approach and the aim of this issue. In particular, we focus on the choice to use the term "metaphilosophy" for the approach through which we explore Sellars' need to integrate the categorial framework of contemporary sciences with the conceptual framework of persons. Besides, by summarising the content of the contributions we bring out the common thread and contrasting elements.&nbsp;</p> Danilo Manca Giacomo Turbanti Copyright (c) 2022 Danilo Manca, Giacomo Turbanti 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 43 48 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.396 Kant and Sellars on the unity of apperception <p>That Wilfrid Sellars claims that the framework of persons is not a descriptive framework, but a normative one is about as well known as any claim that he makes. This claim is at the core of the famous demand for a synoptic image that closes, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” makes its appearance at key moments in the grand argument of, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” and is the capstone of Sellars’ engagement with Kant in <em>Science and Metaphysics</em>. Whereas mere things can be subject to ought-to-be rules – e.g. a clock ought to chime on the hour – to be a person, as Sellars understands it, is to be subject to ought-to-do rules – e.g. one ought to wind one’s clocks to chime on the hour. Prima facie, though, there is more to being a person than just being subject to ought-to-do rules. For example, on at least some common ways of using ‘person’ to be a person is to have a unified consciousness, i.e. to be a single subject of a manifold of experience persisting through time. Arguably, that is what Kant takes a person to be. What I hope to show here is that it is what Sellars takes a person to be too. I.e. the exciting twist here is that as Sellars sees it being a single subject of experience persisting through time is being subject to a particular kind of ought-to-do rules, namely, those concepts-qua-inferential-rules that are the means by which we represent the world of causally-related objects existing in space and persisting through time.</p> David Landy Copyright (c) 2022 David Landy 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 73 96 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.393 Emotion and affect in the space of reasons <p>Wilfrid Sellars’s conception of “the space of reasons” makes critical assumptions about what constitutes persons and human uniqueness. Specifically, Sellars assumes that being human is defined through rationality. Although unique to Sellars, defining humans through rationality is an assumption not without its problems. I trace historical and contemporary issues with ignoring emotion and affect in our definition of persons and attempt to reconcile Sellars’s commitment to behaviorism with a seeming conflict between rationality and emotion.</p> Peter Olen Copyright (c) 2022 Peter Olen 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 125 144 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.392 Does philosophical knowledge presuppose a moral attitude? <p>This paper explores Max Scheler’s metaphilosophical views. In particular, the paper seeks to reconstruct and assess Scheler’s thesis according to which philosophical knowledge presupposes a moral attitude which he describes as an “act of upsurge” on the part of the whole person of the philosopher toward the essential, an act which cannot be found in either the natural worldview or the sciences. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper explores how Scheler approaches the question about the nature of philosophy by focusing on the type of person of the philosopher (section 2). It then examines Scheler’s claim according to which philosophy is fundamentally distinct from the sciences (section 3), before exploring the moral attitude of the philosopher by examining three of its conditions: love, self-humbling, and self-mastery (section 4). The paper presents some challenges and objections against Scheler’s metaphilosophical thesis. In particular, critiques of its metaphysical implications and of the view of science implicit in it are provided (section 5). Finally, it is also argued that the thesis contains a grain of truth and as such a moderate interpretation of it could be defended (section 6). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 7).</p> Íngrid Vendrell Ferran Copyright (c) 2022 Íngrid Vendrell Ferran 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 145 168 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.391 A cybernetic theory of persons: how Sellars naturalized Kant <p>I argue that Sellars’s naturalization of Kant should be understood in terms of how he used behavioristic psychology and cybernetics. I first explore how Sellars used Edward Tolman’s cognitive-behavioristic psychology to naturalize Kant in the early essay “Language, Rules, and Behavior”. I then turn to Norbert Wiener’s understanding of feedback loops and circular causality. On this basis I argue that Sellars’s distinction between signifying and picturing, which he introduces in “Being and Being Known,” can be understood in terms of what I call cybernetic behaviorism. I interpret picturing in terms of cycles of cybernetic behavior and signifying in terms of coordination between cybernetic behavior systems, or what I call triangulated cybernetic behavior. This leads to a formal, naturalistic understanding of personhood as the capacity to engage in triangulated cybernetic behavior. I conclude by showing that Sellars’s thought has the resources, which he did not exploit, for introducing the concept of second-order cybernetics. This suggests that Sellars’s philosophy of mind could be developed in the direction of autopoiesis and enactivism.</p> Carl Sachs Copyright (c) 2022 Carl Sachs 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 97 124 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.389 Some Remarks on the Categories of the Manifest Image <p>This paper addresses the question whether or not philosophical discourse can avail the categories of the scientific image. I argue that the clash of the images is better understood on the semantic rather than the ontologic level and that it results from the challenge to the representational adequacy of the categories tha articulate the conceptual repertoires of the manifest image. A challenge that will be met by a succesful recategorization of the concept of a person in the scientific image. I suggest some reasons to believe that such a recategoritazion is possible in principle without dismantling the philosophical discourse.</p> Giacomo Turbanti Copyright (c) 2021 Giacomo Turbanti 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 49 72 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.388 Metaphilosophy of the Life-world <div><span lang="EN-GB">The aim of this article is to assess whether the notion of “life-world” could be helpful for a philosophical theory that assigns a primacy to the scientific view of the world when it comes to establish what exists. I set out to integrate the concept of “life-world” as understood in Husserl’s late phenomenology with the point of view defended by Sellars in <em>Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man in the World</em>. In what follows, I will consider the image of nature proposed by the standard “Copenhagen” version of quantum physics. This will allow me to challenge Sellars’s assumptions that reality cannot be conceived as stratified<s>,</s> and that the term “phenomenon” has to be meant as “illusory appearance” in a supposedly Kantian sense. At the same time, I will discuss Husserl’s conviction that the ‘technization’ of science entails a philosophical loss of meaning of the scientific image of the world.</span></div> Danilo Manca Copyright (c) 2022 Danilo Manca 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 169 192 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.387 Persons, Peirceish, perfidious pluralism – rescuing Sellars <p>In <em>Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man</em> (1962), Wilfrid Sellars contends that there is <em>tension</em> between manifest image (MI) and scientific image (SI) discursive formations. To end the tension and resolve the <em>clash </em>between the MI and the SI, Sellars does not aim to <em>reconcile</em> the two images. Rather, through the application of his functional classification semantics, typified by his distinction between logical irreducibility and causal reducibility, he aims to <em>join</em> the normative category of persons to the SI, to enrich and complete the SI. In other words, the way all things hang together stereoscopically in one unified and coherent image is by integrating persons into Peirceish. My principal aim in this paper is to argue that, rather than resolve the <em>clash </em>between the MI and the SI by joining the ‘lifeworldy’ conceptual framework of persons to the SI for the purpose of enriching and completing the SI, what Sellars ought to have done is adopt a <em>negative</em> dialectical ‘resolution’ of the clash between the images. This strategy invites one to dismantle the Placement Problem through the logic of “disintegration.” I take Sellars to have curiously hinted at this Adornian intellectual orientation in the concluding sentence of <em>Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind </em>(1956).</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> Paul Giladi Copyright (c) 2021 Paul Giladi 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 193 228 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.386 <em>Manipulated Agents. A Window to Moral Responsibility</em>, by Alfred R. Mele <p>Review of Alfred R. Mele, <em>Manipulated Agents. A Window to Moral Responsibility</em>, Oxford University Press, New York 2019, 174 pages</p> Lorenzo Testa Copyright (c) 2021 2021-09-01 2021-09-01 10 1 R1 R5 <em>The Tyranny of Merit. What’s Become of the Common Good?</em> by Michael J. Sandel <p>Review of Michael J. Sandel, <em>The Tyranny of Merit. What’s Become of the Common Good?</em>, Penguin Random House, London 2020, 270 pages</p> Giulia Balossino Copyright (c) 2021 2021-09-01 2021-09-01 10 1 R6 R10 Ethics, a matter of style? <p>First published in Bernard Williams, <em>L’éthique et les limites de la philosophie</em> [1985], trans. Marie-Anne Lescourret, Editions Gallimard, NRF Essais, Paris 1990, pp. V-XIX. The present edition of this Introduction has been supplemented by a number of footnotes. They have been added by Paolo Babbiotti, Nikhil Krishnan and Mathis Marquier, the authors of “Commentary to B. Williams’s French Introduction to Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy”, published in Philosophical Inquiries, IX, 2-2021: 259-268.</p> Bernard Williams Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-09-08 2021-09-08 10 1 269 284 Commentary to B. Williams’s French Introduction to "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy" <p>The English original of Bernard Williams’s <em>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</em> was published in 1985. Since its publication, it has provoked a substantial body of philosophical commentary, sympathetic as well as critical. Williams’s introduction to the 1990 French translation of <em>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</em> is an unusual text and an illuminating new source for readers of Williams. Refreshingly, it reflects an effort on Williams’s part to establish a connection with a new set of readers. It is also the work of a philosopher relishing the freedoms that come from not having to connect with the old one. Does his introduction itself benefit from a further introduction? We believe that it does, and for the same reason that the book needed some prefatory words before it could be put into the hands of French readers: because the work is not, or no longer, fully self-explanatory.</p> Paolo Babbiotti Nikhil Krishnan Mathis Marquier Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-09-08 2021-09-08 10 1 259 268 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.377 Introduction <p>This is an introduction to the Focus "Art, and especially contemporary art, is often fueled by a need for innovation. Accordingly, the philosophy of art has no shortage of novel topics to address. Furthermore, just like in other areas of philosophical debate, reconsidering less-discussed views on the arts can be a refreshing exercise. Additionally, contemporary reflection on the arts and on aesthetic experience is facing new challenges, stemming from the impact of climate change on the natural and the urban landscape, from the pressing need for intercultural dialogue, and from the acknowledgment of cultural identities related to gender, race, and class. All the authors who successfully responded to our call for papers for the Focus “Philosophy of Art: New Directions” are concerned with the abovementioned issues. The collection, stemming as it does from a call for papers, has no ambition to exhaustiveness, and yet it seems to us that it covers quite a wide range of topics. A variety of research styles is also represented, the only common denominator being the quality of the proposals, in terms of originality, relevance, and argumentative force.of Art: New Directions".</p> Elisa Caldarola Jerrold Levinson Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 10 1 65 68 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.370 On tags and conceptual street art <p>The starting point of this paper is two views. On the one hand, two general claims about street art: first, that all works of street art are subversive (see, e.g., Bacharach 2015; 2018; Chackal 2016; Baldini 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; Willard 2016), second, that works of street art are the result of acts of self-expression (Riggle 2016). On the other hand, a much more specific view about certain contemporary tags produced, roughly, over the past twenty years: those tags are artworks, even though they are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of aesthetic properties grounded in their perceptual properties, because they are works of conceptual street art (see Lewisohn 2010; JAK 2012). The key question of the paper concerns “very early tags” (VETs) – the extremely simple, unadorned tags that first appeared in the late 1960s and that some scholars consider as the historical predecessors of the various practices that today we group under the category “street art” (see, e.g., Young 2014; Gastman et al. 2015): should we regard VETs as artworks? On the one hand, VETs writers tend to answer this question in the negative. On the other hand, already in the early 1970s, artists and intellectuals such as Norman Mailer and Gordon Matta-Clark seemed to believe that it was appropriate to regard both VETs and later tags as art, although they didn’t defend this claim with argument. The view that some contemporary tags that are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of their aesthetic properties might be candidates for appreciation as works of conceptual art suggests a strategy for assessing the issue of whether VETs are candidates for art appreciation: can we defend the claim that the extremely simple, unadorned VETs were presented for appreciation as works of conceptual street art? I argue that we have good reasons to hold this view.</p> Elisa Caldarola Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 10 1 89 110 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.368 “Who inspires who?” Aesthetics in front of AI art <p>AI art certainly belongs among the most under-researched art forms of today. While the ethical aspects of AI are often discussed, its implications for aesthetics are rarely considered. The reason is perhaps that the ability of AI to produce art is a very recent development. Artificial intelligence is becoming more and more important nowadays due to the many changes it has made in our lives. In this context, one of the most surprising fields in which AI has suddenly progressed in the last few years concerns the very human (until now) capacity for artistic (and in a more general sense, aesthetic) expression. However, the general public still tends to confuse AI art with the more general category of digital art, and what AI really does in the artistic field is scarcely known. AI art is not only computer assisted but computer generated. In AI art there is at least one part of the artistic process that is left to the machine. The artist gives the AI some data and has to wait, in order to see how the AI will elaborate upon them. AI, therefore, becomes not just a <em>tool</em> for artists, but also something different, the nature of which needs to be explored. What does AI art have to say about our way of seeing art, and perhaps about our way of seeing the world in general? This will be the leading question of this paper, which will be addressed through the analysis of some relevant aspects of this new kind of art.</p> Alice Barale Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 10 1 195 220 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.367 <em>Of Immediate Apperception</em>, by Maine de Biran <p>Review of Maine de Biran, <em>Of Immediate Apperception</em>, edited by A. Aloisi, M. Piazza and M. Sinclair, Bloomsbury, London-New York 2020, 184 pages.</p> Denise Vincenti Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 R5 R8 <em>Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers</em>, by Cheryl Misak <p>Review of Cheryl Misak, <em>Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers</em>, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, 500 pages</p> Brent C. Odland Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 R1 R4 The dialogical philosophy <p>This essay points out the necessity of evoking several philosophical systems in order to realize the evolution of the scientific theory of knowledge in modern physics. It proposes a sort of spectrum of philosophical systems with seven conceptions set in the following order : realism, empiricism, positivism, rationalism, formalism, conventionalism, idealism. A double filiation unites these philosophies in the center of the spectrum, so that, rationalism, in conjunction with technical materialism, seems to be the most strongly established philosophy, and the backbone of modern scientific thought. Rationalism, far from representing a detached point of view, appears as a dialectical philosophy as soon as it seeks its confirmation in technical experience.</p> Gaston Bachelard Gennaro Lauro Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 231 240 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.363 A dialogical philosophy: Bachelard’s “Introduction” to “Le Rationalisme appliqué” <p>The translation in the following essay of this issue of <em>Philosophical inquiries</em> makes available a preliminary version of what would become the introduction to <em>Le Rationalisme appliqué</em> (Bachelard 1949). We can regard it as a first step towards making <em>Le Rationalisme appliqué</em> accessible to the English readers, hoping that it may lead to a translation of the entire work.</p> <p>The introduction to <em>Le Rationalisme appliqué</em> can be regarded as one of the most canonical expositions of Bachelard’s philosophy of science. It echoes the introductions and conclusions of each of his epistemological works since <em>The New Scientific Spirit</em>, in a series of small philosophical treatises that offer a remarkable continuity.</p> Lucie Fabry Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 211 230 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.362 Introduction. Ian Hacking and the Historical Reason of the Sciences <p>Ian Hacking is among the few that have successfully undermined the Analytic/Continental divide, by working on the “trading zones” between these two strands, and forged their conceptual instruments by drawing these latter from different sources and applying them to widely diverse philosophical debates, across natural, social and medical sciences: debates ranging from the problem of induction and proofs and deduction in mathematics to the theories of meaning and truth as well as to the controversy between realism and constructivism in natural and social sciences.</p> <p>Albeit well-known and widely inspiring, Hacking is still rarely studied, and his wide-ranging production has not yet received an accurate and comprehensive analysis. This Focus aims to precisely fill this gap, by providing one of the first extensive studies dedicated to Hacking’s philosophy. It does not wish, however, to cover all the philosophical areas to which he has possibly contributed, neither does it aim, more generally, to provide a commentary nor an exegesis of his works. By collecting papers by both established and young scholars, this Focus rather intends to explore why Hacking has so largely in- fluenced the field of history and philosophy of science. Analyzing Hacking’s contribution to the 20th-century attempts to bring together history and philosophy of science as well as discussing his arguments on scientific stability, the Focus tackles, from different perspectives, the question of the historicity of reason. Without aspiring to definitive answers, this Focus wishes to open up lines of further research on Hacking’s works as well as along their path.</p> Matteo Vagelli Marica Setaro Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 115 120 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.361 Introduction. Paolo Parrini & relative a priori principles <p>Paolo Parrini devoted concerted philosophical attention to theoretical phi- losophy, re-examining core issues in epistemology, philosophy of language and history and philosophy of science, not only for their intrinsic philosophical interest, but also for their cultural significance. This pair of papers published here in English he himself affiliated closely. “Analyticity and Epistemological Holism: Prague Alternatives” appeared originally in Italian in 2006; “Quine on Analyticity and Holism. A critical appraisal in dialogue with Sandro Nannini,” in 2018. He translated both into English early in 2020, posting their original Italian together with their new English versions on his own website. Doubtless both are related to his research interests in Herbart’s conceptual Bearbeitung, which surely must be a vigorous form of conceptual explication. Most unfortunately, Paolo was taken from us suddenly, unexpectedly, at the start of July (2020). What more we can learn from him, we shall learn from his considerable published accomplishments. This brief Introduction seeks to epitomize the core issues and significance of this pair of papers, in tribute to him and his very substantial philosophical achievements.</p> Kenneth R. Westphal Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 59 78 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.360 Quine on Analyticity and Holism <p>The first four sections evaluate Quine’s thesis that the two dogmas of empiricism (analyticity and reductionism) are at root identical. In particular, a full compatibility is developed and defended between epistemological, anti-reductionist holism and both the analytic/synthetic and <em>a priori/a posteriori</em> distinctions. According to the view defended here, understanding the relations between theory and experience requires not the rejection of such distinctions, but rather their relativization. In the fifth and final section, the importance of such distinctions is shown regarding epistemological analysis and discussions of the relations between science and philosophy.</p> Kenneth R. Westphal Paolo Parrini Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 95 112 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.359 Analyticity and Epistemological Holism: Prague alternatives <p>In the early 1930’s Carnap and Quine met in Prague and discussed logic and philosophy. Carnap was working on the <em>Logische Syntax der Sprache</em>; when Quine went back to Harvard he published “Truth by Convention.” The purpose of the present paper is to establish three main points: (1) in “Truth by Convention” some important aspects of the future position Quine will assume about the analytic/synthetic and the <em>a priori/a posteriori</em> dichotomies are already expressed; (2) in the <em>Logische Syntax der Sprache</em>, Carnap maintains the distinction between L-rules and P-rules, at the same time being aware of the holistic character of empirical control and of the possibility to revise the acceptance of every kind of sentences; (3) Quine’s idea that the holistic conception requires completely abandoning the analytic/synthetic and <em>a priori/a posteriori</em> distinctions does not seem wholly correct. On the contrary, in the <em>Logische Syntax</em> Carnap takes a step forward in his conception of the “relativized <em>a priori</em>”. Thus, we can say that in the Prague years two alternative accounts of the theory/experience relation began to emerge. These two alternatives are still pivotal in the contemporary epistemological debate.</p> Kenneth R. Westphal Paolo Parrini Copyright (c) 2021 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 79 94 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.358 I am hungry, therefore I am. Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic phenomenology as a model for food existentialism <p>By focusing on the hunger drive and the act of eating as existential dimensions, this essay considers the possibility to extend Paul Ricœur’s thought in the direction of food philosophy. By conceiving his hermeneutic phenomenology as a model for food existentialism, this paper aims to discuss hunger and eating as interrelated aspects of human beings’ embodied existence that are involved in the social world. I will begin with a phenomenological description of hunger and eating referring to Ricœur’s analysis of the corporeal involuntary as offering the base features to develop what I will call an “interpretive existential philosophy of being hungry and eating.” Then, I will turn to hunger and eating as involved in the real complexity of temporal experience. These reflections will lead to examining the interplay of cosmic time and lived time in relation to hunger and eating, opening up the discussion of the gustatory time through the intersection of the objective time of the clock and the subjective time of the stomach.</p> <p> </p> Vendra Maria Cristina Clorinda Copyright (c) 2022 Philosophical Inquiries 2022-03-04 2022-03-04 10 1 25 40 10.4454/philinq.v10i1.351 Understanding stability in cognitive neuroscience through Hacking's lens <p>Ian Hacking instigated a revolution in 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy of science by putting experiments (“interventions”) at the top of a philosophical agenda that historically had focused nearly exclusively on representations (“theories”). In this paper, I focus on a set of conceptual tools Hacking (1992) put forward to understand how laboratory sciences become stable and to explain what such stability meant for the prospects of unity of science and kind discovery in experimental science. I first use Hacking’s tools to understand sources of instability and disunity in rodent behavioral neuroscience. I then use them to understand recent grass-roots collaborative initiatives aimed at establishing stability in this research area and tease out some implications for unity of science and kind creation and discovery in cognitive neuroscience.</p> Jacqueline Sullivan Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-02-25 2021-02-25 10 1 189 208 10.4454/philinq.v9i1.346 On Fraudulence in Art Contemporary art is frequently accused to be fraudulent. Usually explained away as an epiphenomenon, the experience of fraudulence is rarely investigated <em>per se</em>. This paper closely examines Stanley Cavell’s stance on the issue, comparing it with the positions implied in Arthur Danto’s, Nelson Goodman’s and Richard Wollheim’s aesthetics. Reflections on examples of fraudulent art in the history of visual art lead to partly dismiss Cavell’s position in his own term: fraudulent art can be part of the media resources which might allow an artist to “keep faith with tradition.” The impression of fraudulence is then dependent on the ontology of contemporary artworks. Andrea Maistrello Copyright (c) 2021 Philosophical Inquiries 2021-08-02 2021-08-02 10 1 69 88 10.4454/philinq.v9i2.345