

Two Notions of (Mis)-Identification

Jérémie Lafraire

Abstract: Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM) has inspired much new research in a broad range of disciplines, from contemporary philosophy of mind and language to semantics and cognitive science. However, a reasonable suspicion is that several distinct notions of IEM are mixed up in the relevant literature. To avoid confusion and to provide an adequate understanding of what IEM is supposed to be, two distinct notions of (mis)identification have been distinguished. The first one (identification 2) comes from Gareth Evans' negative characterization of IEM, and the second one (identification 1) has been introduced by Jim Pryor. In this paper, I show how Pryor's notion filled a gap between the Evansian account of vulnerability to error through misidentification and his examples of judgments immune to error through misidentification. Using these two notions, I then construct a matrix that generates four situations that exhaust Evans' negative and positive examples for IEM. This produces an interesting, though problematic, situation (situation 3: *identification 2* without *identification 1*). To determine whether or not this theoretical possibility corresponds to a genuine situation, I provide plausible candidates involving certain demonstrative judgments.

Keywords: immunity to error through misidentification, identification-freedom, demonstratives reference.

0. Introduction

Immunity to error through misidentification is a property of some kinds of knowledge, and by extension, of some judgments, such that these judgments are not liable to a specific sort of error. For a judgment of the predicative type, an error through misidentification is defined as being wrong about the identity of the predication's subject. For example, I see a man in the street wearing a black hat and I think it is my friend Paul. So, I form the judgment that Paul is wearing a black hat. But I am wrong: it is not Paul, but another man who is wearing the hat. I have misidentified this other man as being the one who instantiates the relevant property: wearing a black hat.

From Wittgenstein's analyses in the *Blue Book* (Wittgenstein, 1958), we know that some judgments apparently do not share the same vulnerability to this type of error. Consider certain self-ascriptions such as 'I am in pain'. In this case the possibility of an error like the previous one mentioned, seems to be excluded. Can I be wrong about the object that instantiates the predicate '() be in pain' when I am in pain? At first, this question does not make any sense; perhaps because, in this case, *I do not have to identify* any object to know that I am in pain.

Wittgenstein pointed out that it was relevant, when giving an account of immunity to error through misidentification, that a self-ascription needed to be free of recognition of a person. Yet Wittgenstein did not specify this notion of recognition, and the property to be free of recognition was swallowed up in a cluster of others factors that can be inferred from Wittgenstein's examples. Indeed, his examples are only self-ascriptions, only psychological predicates are embedded in them, and the first-person in these clauses, according to Wittgenstein, is not a referring term.

Therefore, even if it seems trivial to say that immunity to error through misidentification (hereafter IEM) is guaranteed by an absence of identification on which a given judgment could depend, we inherit the following question from Wittgenstein: What are we to understand by identification? The aim of this paper is to distinguish between several notions of identification relevant to a reflection on IEM. Before exploring these distinctions I will examine some theories of IEM that place the identification problem at the core of their analyses.

In this paper I distinguish a first notion of identification (*identification 2*) based on Evans' negative characterization of IEM. According to Evans, to be liable to error through misidentification, a judgment has to be *identification 2*-dependent. The notion of identification involved in this negative characterization is associated with what I dub the *E-structure*. The *E-structure* contains a pair of propositions: a singular proposition, and an identification component (an identity statement between two *de re concepts*). This negative characterization of IEM as the absence of *E-structure* does not rule out trivial cases of IEM, such as those linked to descriptive constraints on the way reference is fixed. Following Evans, in order to focus on the more interesting immune judgments, I introduce an additional positive criterion concerning the way of gaining information from the object on which the judgment in question is based. However, Evans' conflation of vulnerability to error through misidentification with presence of the *E-structure* leads us to question whether such an error could occur even in its absence.

A particular case of error through misidentification pointed out by Pryor provides us with a positive answer. This leads us to *identification 1*,¹ understood as the move from an existential statement based on an epistemic state to a singular judgment. Whereas Evans' positive examples for IEM imply *identification 2*-freedom as much as *identification 1*-freedom, *identification 1*-dependence was previously unnoticed as a relevant factor for liability to error through misidentification. Pryor's notion thus fills the gap between Evans' negative and positive characterizations of IEM. Using these two notions, I construct a matrix that generates four situations that exhaust Evans' negative and positive examples for IEM. This produces an interesting, though problematic, situation (situation 3: *identification 2* without *identification 1*). To determine whether or not this theoretical possibility corresponds to a genuine situation, I provide plausible candidates involving certain demonstrative judgments. I suggest that when the use of a demonstrative term is based on a single body of information gained through a single perceptual modality, demonstrative judgments do not have to be based on an *identification 1*, but can still feature in the grounds of an *identification 2*. This is also the case when the demonstrative judgment corresponds to a location ascription. The particular role played by this property in perceptual binding makes the demonstrative judgment free from *identification 1*, but does not preclude the possibility of *identification 2*. I maintain that our matrix can be useful as a tool for investigating forms of IEM involving demonstrative judgments. The explanation for such a property will have to be sought in the basic perceptual knowledge upon which such judgments rest.

1. *Error through Misidentification and Identification-Dependence*

Gareth Evans' characterization of IEM seems to be linked to his notion of *identification-freedom*. Knowledge of the truth of a singular proposition [a is F] is identification-free if, and only if it is not identification-dependent. To be *not* identification-dependent means that the knowledge in question cannot be seen as the result of knowledge of the truth of a pair of propositions, [b is F] and [a=b]. In other words, knowledge of these two propositions does not feature in the identifica-

¹ Pryor provides convincing reasons to believe that this second notion is, in some important sense, more primitive than Evans'. This is the reason why I name Pryor's notion 'identification 1'.

tion-free knowledge's grounds.² Evans calls the second proposition $[a=b]$ the '*identification-component*'. The '*identification-component*' must be understood as an identity statement. The first proposition of the pair $[b \text{ is } F]$ is another singular proposition. For example: a subject forms the judgment: 'this man is a professor of History' upon the basis of his belief that X is a professor of history and his belief that this man is X . Clearly the judgment is vulnerable to error through misidentification, as the identity-component, $[this \text{ man is } x]$, could be false. Thus, according to Evans, if we have the following structure (I shall name it the *E-structure*):

- (α) $b \text{ is } F$
- (β) $a = b$
- (γ) ' $a \text{ is } F$ '³

where (γ) is the manifest judgment with (α) and (β) as grounds, then we have liability to error through misidentification for this manifest judgment. This is Evans's negative characterization of IEM. Indeed, a judgment is immune to error through misidentification if its grounds are not *E-structured*, if this judgment is identification-free.

Evans formulates a transcendental argument in favor of the existence of identification-free judgments. Indeed, according to Evans, the very existence of such judgments is a condition for the possibility of true singular beliefs. I propose to reconstruct the argument in the following way:

- [1] Let us suppose that there are no *identification-free judgments*.
- [2] All judgments are thus *identification-dependent* (reformulation of [1])
- [3] Therefore all judgments' grounds are *E-structured* (reformulation of [1] using the *identification-dependence* definition)
- [4] Let (1) be the first personal judgment: 'I am in pain' ($a \text{ is } F$)
- [5] (1) depends upon a pair of propositions such that: (thanks to [3])
 - (2) $a \text{ is } b : I \text{ am } b$
 - (3) $b \text{ is } F : b \text{ is in pain}$
- [6] (3) is a singular proposition that a singular judgment could express, thus
 - (3) has *E-structured* grounds too: (thanks to [3])
 - (3) $b \text{ is } F$ rests on a pair of propositions:

² There are, at least, two ways in which the grounds for given judgments may be described. The first consists in identifying structured propositions that could be expressed to justify the judgments concerned. The second is related to mental representations involving concepts. Hereafter, when I use the notion of 'grounds,' I will use it by default in the first sense or, if I switch to the other approach, a note will specify it.

³ I use quotation marks for the manifest judgment in which I ascertain whether there is immunity or vulnerability to error through misidentification.

- (4) b is c
 (5) c is F : c is in pain
- [7] As for (3), (5) is a singular proposition and thus depends upon:
 (6) c is d
 (7) d is F
- [8] We recognize the same dependence for proposition (7), and for the singular proposition upon which proposition (7) relies, and for the singular proposition upon which the proposition upon which proposition (7) relies, and so on... The fact that all the judgments are identification-dependent undoubtedly implies this infinite regress at the level of grounds. This infinite regress precludes the possibility of any singular true belief. As a result, Evans' argument allows us to see that identification-free judgments have an epistemological priority over identification-dependent ones. Indeed, for the latter, to be grounded by the former halts the infinite regress.

However, this negative characterization of IEM as merely the absence of the *E-structure*, does not rule out trivial cases of IEM. For example,⁴ let the descriptive name 'Julius' refer to the sole inventor of the zip. Suppose we have reason to think that there was an inventor of the zip, and only one. We hence form the judgment that 'Julius was the sole inventor of the zip'. Our judgment is undeniably liable to error. Indeed we can be wrong: in fact, there was no inventor of the zip, it was an accidental artifact or something like that. But the point is that it is impossible to be right about there having been a sole inventor of the zip, and at the same time wrong about which person it was. It cannot be that we do know there was a sole inventor of the zip, but that we made a mistake in thinking that it was Julius rather than somebody else, because there is no identity statement: $(\beta) a = b$ at the level of the grounds for the judgment. Here, a descriptive constraint on the way the Julius reference is fixed is the reason why our judgment is trivially immune to error through misidentification.

In order to rule out such trivial cases of IEM, Evans specifies a narrow sense of identification-freedom: "(...) knowledge of truth of a singular proposition is identification-free in the narrow sense if (i) it is not identification-dependent and (ii) it is based on a way of gaining information from objects" (Evans 1982, 181) While the first clause is only negative, the second one introduces a positive criterion. In order to explain this positive criterion, Evans provides a second class of examples for

⁴ I borrow this example from John Campbell's reworking of Evan's remarks.

IEM: ‘This one is red’ or ‘I have my legs bent’. For these judgments: “(...) there is a way of gaining information of the condition of objects such that for a subject to have information that the property of being F_i is instantiated in this way (for some one of a range of relevant properties, $F_1 \dots F_n$) just is for the subject to have information that [a is F_i] is true.” (Evans 1982: 180) Consider the following example: I know, in the usual way, that I have an urge to urinate. The usual way I gain this information, that my bladder is full, cannot be a way in which I could know that *your* bladder is full, and that *you* have an urge to urinate. Therefore, if I lose the grounds for my judgment that ‘my bladder is full’, I still do not believe the following existential generalization: [there is an x such that x has a full bladder].

Can we not, however, imagine the following objection? What if the subject’s system were to be tricked in such a way that the information he processes comes from a bladder other than his own? That is to say that he feels the urge to urinate as if his own bladder were full, whereas in fact it is someone else’s. If, on the basis of his feeling an urge, the subject forms the following judgment: ‘My bladder is full’, it seems that we have a case of error through misidentification, whereas the subject is relying on a subjective way of gaining information. To understand Evans’ response to this objection, we have to examine the grounds supporting the subject’s judgment. The judgment’s ground is an epistemic state gained through a mode such that information gained through it, concerns the subject alone. This fact depends upon the system’s cognitive architecture and allows the subject not to be represented in the content self-ascribed. Thus, at the level of grounds, the subject does not feature in a premise that would be an identity statement involving him and the man whose bladder is full. A piece of evidence supporting this argument is that, if the subject loses his grounds for the judgment: ‘my bladder is full’, he cannot still believe ‘someone’s bladder is full’. According to Evans, this case is quite close to a hallucination, not to an error through misidentification. The judgment concerned does not rely on an identification component whose falsity could induce error through misidentification. Instead, it relies on an assumption about the normal functioning of the system. This assumption *is not* a premise featuring in the grounds for the judgment. It is more of a background belief. Given the way information is gained, the judgment is identification-free and therefore not liable to error through misidentification, merely liable to error *tout court*, as in the case of hallucinations.

I have shown that Evans’ negative examples for IEM, judgments liable

to error through misidentification, have *E-structured* grounds. Possibility of error through misidentification is thus linked to the property of identification-dependence, depending notably upon a proposition that can be expressed by an identity judgment. Now I shall examine the possibility of error through misidentification without identification-dependence in Evans' sense. I will argue, according to James Pryor (1999), that this special type of error can occur without the *E-structure* mentioned above.

2. Another Kind of Identification

Pryor works with two notions of identification, one of which is Evans' notion and is linked to what Pryor names *de re* misidentification. "(...) we have a case of *de re* misidentification whenever one's justification for the proposition believed, or expressed, rests on one's prior justification for believing, among other things, a certain identity assumption – and this identity assumption turns out to be false." (Pryor 1999: 275). We recognize here Evans' equation between liability to error through misidentification and the fact that the grounds for a judgment are *E-structured*.

However, according to Pryor, Evans has missed an important case of error through misidentification, which is not linked to the *E-structure* mentioned above. This second notion of identification is Pryor's original point and is introduced in the following scenario:

I smell a skunky odor, and see several animals rummaging around in my garden. None of them has the characteristic white stripes of a skunk, but I believe that some skunks lack these stripes. Approaching closer and sniffing, I form the belief, of the smallest of these animals, that it is a skunk in my garden. This belief is mistaken. There are several skunks in my garden, but none of them is the small animal I see. (Pryor 1999: 283)

I suggest, in accordance with Pryor, that this scenario may be analyzed in the following way: Although I could be correct in thinking that the property: $\lambda x [(reeks\ of\ skunk\ in\ my\ garden)\ x]$ ⁵ is instantiated, I could be wrong about *which object* instantiates it: I have singled out the smallest animal but in fact it is another one that instantiates the property and is the causal origin of the skunky odor⁶. In this case, my error

⁵ I substitute this predicate to $\lambda x [(is\ a\ skunk\ in\ my\ garden)\ x]$ to avoid an additional useless inferential step from '...reeks of skunk in my garden' to '...is a skunk in my garden'. It makes no difference regarding Pryor's position.

⁶ The predicate is such that it suggests the existence of a causal origin. This could lead the

seems not to be implied by the falsity of any identification component.

Let us specify this difference between Evansian error through misidentification and what Pryor names *which object*-misidentification (hereafter *wb*-misidentification). In Pryor's scenario, smelling the skunky odor makes the subject inclined to entertain an existential thought whose content is: there is an x such that x reeks of skunk, and *not* a singular one. On the contrary, in the *E-structure*, the first proposition (α) of the pair that grounds the manifest judgment is a singular proposition. In the skunk situation, error through misidentification occurs during the process of 'singling out'. This process corresponds to a move from an existential proposition to a singular one. No such process, and hence transition, occurs in the *de re* misidentification, because no existential statement is a part of the manifest judgment's grounds.

Therefore, it seems we have a case of error through misidentification that does not rest upon the *E-structure* of the manifest judgment's grounds. So, quoting Pryor 1999: 282, a case of *wb-misidentification* occurs when:

- (i) A subject has some grounds G that offer him knowledge of the existential generalization: there is some x such that x is F .
- (ii) Partly on the basis of G , the subject is also justified, or takes himself to be justified, in believing of some object a that it is F .
- (iii) But in fact a is not F . Some distinct object (or objects) y is F , and it is because the grounds G "derive" in the right way from this fact about y that they offer the subject knowledge that there is some x such that x is F .

Pryor undoubtedly provides an interesting case of error through misidentification quite different from Evans' negative example. However, it is not obvious where this difference may be located. According to Pryor, the difference lies at the level of the grounds. Indeed, the grounds of a demonstrative judgment, like the one in the previous situation, do not contain an identification component *à la* Evans. Thus the judgment's liability to error cannot be explained by the possible falsity of such an identification component. Rather, error occurs during the process of singling out the right candidate satisfying the predicative conditions. All we have so far are an initial epistemic state that justifies the belief in an existential statement, and a singular judgment that results from the identifi-

subject to enrich the existential statement: there is some x such that x reeks of skunk, with a unicity condition, and to move from this existential proposition to a definite description: 'the x that reeks of skunk in my garden'.

cation considered as such a process of ‘singling out’. According to Pryor, in the *wh*-case, we do not find a similar pattern of epistemic dependence on two propositions (a singular one and an identification component) for the manifest judgment, as we do for the *de re* case.

However, is this a difference about the way the grounds are structured, or about the nature of the conceptual ingredients of thoughts that the subject is inclined to entertain given these grounds? Remark that in Pryor’s scenario, it is plausible that the judgment rests on a sort of identification component, as in the Evansian negative characterization of IEM. The identity would be the following: *This animal (which I am seeing now) = the x such that x reeks of skunk in my garden*. We can imagine that smelling a skunky odor in my garden leads me to entertain a singular concept that corresponds to the definite description featuring in the identity statement. According to Annalisa Coliva (2006), we then have a similar structure concerning the grounds in the *de re* and the *wh*-case. The difference is related to what is embedded in the identification component. Coliva presents this idea as an objection to Pryor. But I contend that it is consistent with what Pryor says:

One might be tempted to say that, as with *de re* misidentification, cases of *wh*-misidentification also involve a ‘mistaken identity assumption.’ For instance, one might say that, in Example 10, I’ve mistakenly identified what I’m smelling as the small animal I see. But this is not an ‘identity assumption’ of the sort I described before: I’m not yet in a position to believe, of some thing that I’m smelling, that it is identical to anything else. In fact, I’m not yet in a position to hold any *de re* beliefs about any of the things I’m smelling. I don’t yet have any correct beliefs, about some particular animal, that I am smelling it, or that it is a skunk in my garden. My problem is precisely to arrive at such a *de re* belief. I’m trying to figure out which animal, if any is a skunk that I’m smelling. (Pryor 1999: 282)

Note that Pryor’s remark is more about the first proposition of the *E-structure* than about the identification component. Indeed, Pryor does not exclude the presence of a tacit identity statement in the grounds. It is plausible that I identify the object I am seeing as ‘the *x* such that *x* reeks of skunk in my garden’. But Pryor’s point is to show that, because my epistemic access to the causal origin of the skunky odor is limited, I cannot entertain any *de re* belief of this individual. To do this, I have to be ‘*en rapport*’⁷ with ‘the *x* that reeks of skunk in my garden’, and it is clear-

⁷ To be *en rapport* with an object means to have non-inferential, direct epistemic access to it such that I can entertain *de re* belief of that object.

ly not the case in our scenario. To borrow a famous distinction from Russell, in the skunk scenario there are two sorts of knowledge: *knowledge by acquaintance* and *knowledge by description*. The first is linked to my epistemic access to this animal I see, and the second to my descriptive⁸ access, so to speak, to the real causal origin of the skunky odor. This difference reflects the difference between two kinds of proposition: an existential proposition, and a singular one that is obtained following the process of identification understood as a ‘singling out’ process.

So we can contrast what happens in the skunk scenario with the ‘professor of history’ example that Evans gives to illustrate, in his view, a genuine case of error through misidentification. In the skunk situation, the subject smells a skunky odor and forms the belief that ‘there is some x such that x reeks of skunk in my garden’. Because the odor should have a causal origin, the subject can, as a result, use the definite description: ‘the x such that x reeks of skunk’ during the process of singling out the right candidate. Indeed he can identify this animal that he is seeing with ‘the x such that... etc.’ But, unlike in Evans’ situation, the subject cannot have any *de re* belief of ‘the x...’ in question.

To sum up, the principal difference between *de re misidentification* and *wh-misidentification* is that the former concerns judgments based on the E-structure, in which a singular proposition is embedded, whereas the latter concerns judgments based on an existential one. Thus, undoubtedly, Pryor’s analysis captures a type of phenomenon excluded by Evans’ conditions regarding the grounds for the judgment (demonstrative or not) that is vulnerable to error through misidentification.

3. *Two Notions of Identification for a Systematic Account of IEM*

From the two previous sections I extract two notions of identification linked to two distinctive kinds of error⁹. First, we have Pryor’s identification (which I shall name *identification 1*), which is characterized as the move from an existential proposition, to a singular one. The subject is inclined to believe in an existential proposition thanks to a certain epistemic state giving him knowledge that a certain property is instantiated.

⁸ Note that my access to ‘the x such that x reeks of skunk in my garden’ is not *purely* descriptive, because I am causally related to this individual in smelling its odor. However it is certainly not sufficient for me to entertain any *de re* beliefs about it.

⁹ See Table 1.

However this epistemic state is not sufficient to entertain any *de re* belief about the object that, in fact, instantiates the property. The subject's access to the 'instantiator'¹⁰ is such that he is not *en rapport* with it. In this situation, the subject's initial knowledge corresponds roughly to what Russell names 'knowledge by description'. The move from an existential to a singular proposition makes it possible for the subject to entertain *de re* beliefs about the 'instantiator'. This transition requires identifying the object that instantiates the relevant property. This identification, considered as the process of 'singling out', is what gives rise to vulnerability in the first type of error through misidentification: the subject could be wrong in singling out which object instantiates the property, or in identifying demonstratively an object as the 'instantiator'.

The second notion is the Evansian one that I shall name *identification 2*. This identification is linked to the *E-structure* of the grounds. The manifest judgment rests on two propositions: the identification component and a singular proposition. In this case, error through misidentification comes from the falsity of the identification component.

So *identification 1* is a process of singling out triggered by an epistemic state moving on from an existential proposition to a singular one. And *identification 2* implies a genuine identity statement between two objects about which the subject can entertain *de re* beliefs.

Table 1. Two notions of identification.

	<i>Grounds' structure and composition</i>	<i>Kind of error</i>
<i>Identification 1</i> as a process of 'singling out'	Epistemic state →There is some x such that (F)x causal origin idea→the x such that (F)x the x such that...= a — 'a is F'	<i>Which-object</i> misidentification
<i>Identification 2</i> linked to the <i>E-structure</i>	b is F (singular proposition) b = a (identification-component) — 'a is F'	Evansian error through misidentification or <i>de re</i> misidentification

¹⁰ The 'instantiator' corresponds to the definite description that could be obtained from the pair: existential proposition plus causal origin idea.

Given this distinction, it is interesting to examine how these two notions are related. Two questions have to be considered: i) Are these two notions cumulative? ii) Given Evans' negative characterization of IEM as the absence of the *E-structure* (in other words the absence of *identification-2*), can we have an Evansian positive example for IEM (an immune judgment) that could resting on an *identification-1*?

Regarding the second question, we find that Evans' positive characterization of IEM implies both *identification 2*-freedom and *identification 1*-freedom. Indeed, whereas in the skunk scenario we have the possibility of distinguishing¹¹ between information that there is some *x* such that *x* reeks of skunk, and information that this animal reeks of skunk (the judgment resulting from the 'singling out' process); in the Evansian positive examples there is only, so to speak, a single body of information. Let us examine the following quotation:

What we would say is that a judgment is identification-free if it is based upon a way of knowing about objects such that it does not make sense for the subject to utter 'Something is *F*, but is it a that is *F*?', when the first component expresses knowledge which the subject does not think he has, or may have, gained in any other way. (Evans 1982: 190)

In other words, for a genuine identification-free judgment, *there is no gap*, for the subject, between the information that the relevant property is instantiated and the information that *a*¹² instantiates this property. The mode of gaining information is such that knowing the property is instantiated amounts to knowing, without identification (*identification 1* or *identification 2*), which object instantiates the property, because the mode is in a sense *object-involving*. Thus, *identification 1*-freedom is, in a sense, tacitly included in Evans' positive examples whereas *identification 1* was excluded by equating vulnerability to error through misidentification and the presence of the *E-structure* (*identification 2*-dependence). Pryor's notion filled a gap between the Evansian account of vulnerability to error through misidentification and his examples of judgments immune to error through misidentification.

Concerning the first question, I give a positive answer by citing the following situation in which the two types of identification occur. Suppose that the situation is like the previous one but that I have a supplementary

¹¹ Indeed, I can lose my grounds for the belief that 'this animal reeks of skunk in my garden' but still believe that 'there is some *x* such that *x* reeks of skunk in my garden'.

¹² Where '*a*' is schematic for an object.

background true belief. I know that my neighbor has a pet skunk, Robert. Sometimes Robert explores my garden, passing through the hedge. So I smell the skunky odor, I single out (*identification 1*) an animal as ‘the x such that x reeks of skunk’ (at this moment I form the judgment (i) ‘this animal reeks of skunk’. And, further, I *identify 2* this animal as Robert, my neighbor’s pet skunk. Then, I form the judgment: (ii) ‘Robert reeks of skunk in my garden.’ In this situation 1, we recognize the two notions of identification, *identification 1* as a singling out process, and *identification 2* implying *E-structure*. Here, the pair of propositions involved in the *E-structure* is: (α) This animal reeks of skunk in my garden (β) this animal is Robert. The first is a singular proposition resulting from the ‘singling out’ process and the second is an identity statement between two objects about which I can entertain *de re* beliefs. The possibility of cumulating the two notions of identification in situation 1 allows us to conceive three other situations represented by the following matrix:

	Situation 1	Situation 2	Situation 3	Situation 4
<i>Identification 1</i>	+	+	-	-
<i>Identification 2</i>	+	-	+	-

Situation 4 is unproblematic because it corresponds to Evans’ positive examples. For a judgment such that ‘I am smelling a skunky odor in my garden’, given the mode of gaining information that the property λx [(is smelling a skunky odor in my garden) x] is instantiated, there is no gap between this information and the information that *I am* smelling a skunky odor in my garden. Therefore no identification of any sort is needed.

Situation 2 is unproblematic too, because it corresponds to what happens in the Pryor scenario. Indeed, smelling a skunky odor leads me to entertain a general thought: ‘there is some x such that x reeks of skunk in my garden’. Then, I can identify an object demonstratively as ‘the x that reeks of skunk in my garden’ and change my initial general thought into a singular one and, so, entertain *de re* beliefs about the singled-out individual. As a result of this process, when faced with an animal, I can form the following judgment: (i) ‘This animal reeks of skunk in my garden’. In this case, my judgment does not depend on *E-structured* grounds, but only on initial information that the relevant property is instantiated, information gained by the sense of smell. There is no genuine identification component and no singular proposition (at most a general one) in my judgment’s grounds, but a process of

singling out corresponding to *identification 1*.

Situation 3 is more interesting. Can we have an *identification 2* without *identification 1*? Imagine a situation unlike the skunk scenario in that a demonstrative judgment does not depend on two distinct perceptive modalities (the sense of smell and visual access), but only on one. Consider the following example: I see a man running, and I think ‘this man is running’. Information concerning the instantiation of the property and information concerning the object is gained through a single epistemic access-mode, visual perception. The subject thus gains a unified body of information in which the object and property are merged. If we analyze *identification 1* as the act of combining two informational bodies, then, in this type of example, our demonstrative judgment obviously does not rest on such an identification. If I then later identify the man I see as Robert, and think ‘Robert is running’, we may have a case where a judgment rests on *identification 2* without resting on *identification 1*.

Another example of situation 3 may perhaps be found in Campbell’s (1999) ideas concerning the immunity of certain demonstrative judgments in which an object is ascribed a location. According to Campbell, the causal origin of such an immunity is linked to the problem of perceptual binding. Several perceptual features would be perceived as a single object by virtue of their common relationship to the same location. If our ability to use demonstratives (eg. ‘that animal’) depends on our having solved the binding problem, then our solving this problem gives a special place to location. Judgments ascribing location to the demonstrated object then become immune to error through misidentification. The following would be an example of such a situation: I am in my garden, and I see a skunk. I then form the demonstrative judgment ‘this animal is here’. To paraphrase Campbell, in this case, I can have no ground for doubt that the demonstrated object is at the perceived location, which is not also ground for doubt about whether I know that anything at all is at that place. This is clearly not the case in Pryor’s skunk scenario: I can have ground for doubt that the demonstrated object reeks of skunk in my garden, and this ground does not necessarily have to be a ground for doubt about whether I know that something reeks of skunk in my garden. The difference between both scenarios shows that there is not necessarily an *identification 1* when we ascribe a location to a demonstrated object. But the absence of *identification 1* does not rule out the possibility of an *identification 2*. I can *identify 2* this animal with Robert and then judge that ‘Robert is here’. Once again, in this situation, it seems that an *identification 2* occurs without *identification 1*.

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