Weaver of the wind
Aldo Giorgio Gargani and
the “sense of possibility”¹

Carlo Gabbani

Aldo Giorgio Gargani was born in Genoa in 1933. He studied in Pisa at the Scuola Normale Superiore and at the University of Pisa. The philosophical milieu in Cambridge during the first half of the 20th century (Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein), was the subject of his dissertation, written under the direction of Francesco Barone (1923-2001).² This was certainly not such a common topic in Italy during the fifties and, after graduating, Gargani completed his training in Oxford, at The Queen’s College, under the supervision of the eminent Wittgenstein scholar Brian McGuinness.³ This period proved to be crucial for his intellectual development.⁴ Gargani was then for a long period of time Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pisa and continued to give courses and seminars even after he retired. He passed away on June 18, 2009.

From his student years on, the philosophy and the figure of Ludwig Wittgenstein was not just the main focus but also an essential source of inspiration for Gargani’s research, as rich and varied as it was. In 1966, Gargani’s first book was indeed devoted to Wittgenstein, and it was probably the best Italian essay on the philosopher at that time.⁵ Gargani was also the editor of the

¹ I am very grateful to Alberto and Marco Gargani for consenting to the translation of their father’s text, which is appearing here in English for the first time.
² A self-portrait of Gargani is in: Gargani 2008a; see also the extensive dialogue with M. Iofrida: Gargani 2002, available also in English.
³ Cf.: Gargani 2006, ed.
⁴ “Oxford aroused an emotion beyond words, because, on the one hand, it conveyed the robustness of a centuries-old experience, and, on the other, showed the brightness of a deep novelty as a result of an open-minded philosophical engagement, and it expressed itself through the revision of philosophical received orthodoxies. It was Oxford. As soon as he arrived, Gargani had the feeling of knowing nothing, to have learned nothing and that it was necessary to start from scratch” (Gargani 2008a: 259; but see also: Gargani 1990b: 106 ff).
Italian translation of many of Wittgenstein’s texts, for which he wrote introductory texts. His essays on this author were published in various languages, in both journals and volumes. Reflections on Wittgenstein’s philosophy thus appeared consistently throughout Gargani’s work up to the end of his life, and he also paid great attention to the most recent interpretations. Nearly all of his writings on Wittgenstein reflected not only his deep knowledge of the texts and a profound insight into the Wittgenstein’s perspective on life and philosophical practice, but also Gargani’s own philosophical agenda. Over time, the theoretical dimension emerged as an essential element in many of Gargani’s writings, even if he also published important essays with a primarily historical focus (see for instance: Gargani 1971). At the same time, Gargani pursued this theoretical and creative work as part of an ongoing dialogue with contemporary classics that he read and interpreted with great passion. And by just glancing at the titles of the essays included in his collected papers, one can see that the authors he dealt with were not only professional philosophers, but also novelists, musicians, mathematicians, psychoanalysts, and so on. In the wake of his study of Wittgenstein, Gargani became one of the most authoritative experts of Austrian culture between the 19th and the 20th century. He focused on a number of the key figures of the Viennese scene: from Musil to Hofmannsthal and Kraus, from Boltzmann to Mach and Schlick, from Freud to Schönberg. But the range of Gargani’s interests was even broader, reaching from 19th century European literature (Kafka, Pirandello, Beckett), to psychoanalysis and neuroscience (Matte Blanco, Resnik, Edelman).

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8 Cf. Gargani 2005; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d.
9 Here we are referring, for instance, to the interpretations that can be ascribed to the so-called New Wittgenstein (cf.: Crary-Read 2000, eds.). Also in the essay presented here, Gargani’s sympathy for this approach emerges, especially as far as the “austere conception” of nonsense in Wittgenstein is concerned (see also: Gargani 2003: 49-87; 2008b: xiii-xxv e 136-138). Against this approach see Hacker 2000.
10 This happened especially after his important book Il sapere senza fondamenti (Gargani 1975, then: 2009) appeared – a volume of “historical-critical research” which, according to Gargani (2002: 39), “through an exercise of a theoretical kind (…) led to the assertion of several theses – the rejection of a foundational knowledge, and the rejection of ahistorical, atemporal bases of knowledge, the constructivist and performative matrix of knowledge, once again with a critical and polemic attitude towards a theory of truth as correspondence”. In this period Gargani was also the editor of a very important volume: Crisi della ragione (1979). The book triggered many discussions and misunderstandings, but was emblematic of the Italian cultural debate in those years, and was especially concerned with the limits and flaws of foundationalism and the traditional forms of rationality.
In addition to this, some of the leading analytical philosophers of our times (Quine, Donald Davidson, Goodman, Putnam, Brandom and Cavell) played a pivotal role in his intellectual development. Personal friendships also evolved with some of these thinkers, like Richard Rorty, or other younger American philosophers, like James Conant (whose importance can also be appreciated in this essay), or Arnold Davidson, who also contributed significantly to making Gargani’s work known.

The hallmark of Gargani’s essays is a very personal and appealing style of writing that is often free of academic conventions. This is joined by talent and freedom to cross the borders and dogmas that characterise different philosophical traditions and trends. Thus, in his papers Gargani was able to mix accurate references to, say, Frege, Wittgenstein or Quine, with ones to Nietzsche or Heidegger and others. Moreover, within the same paper he often combined insights from philosophy with ideas and perspectives drawn from literature, musical theory, physics, mathematics or neuroscience. He always did this with creative and analogical skill, without losing the theoretical point that he was trying to make. While this “polyphony of thought”, as it has been rightly labelled, may be fascinating for many readers, it might also be disconcerting for others; it probably contributed to the considerable circulation of Gargani’s writings even outside philosophical departments, as well as to making the impact they had on philosophical analytic circles less profound than it may otherwise have been.

This option for a particular style of writing was then to become very evident in some of Gargani’s books of the 1980’s and 1990’s, hanging in the balance between the specialist essay and a first-person, autobiographical meditation. This

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12 Cavell had a pioneering role in highlighting the relationship between Kierkegaard’s and Wittgenstein’s approach and thus also played a major part in Gargani’s analysis of this topic. In 1964, he wrote: “Both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard see their worlds as laboring under illusion. Both see their function as authors to be the uncovering or diagnosing of this illusion, and freeing us from it. In both, the cure requires that we be brought (back) to our human existence” (Cavell 1964, § III: 217; see also: pp. 233-234).


14 Among Conant’s essays relevant to this topic and also mentioned by Gargani: Conant 1989; 1993. For a critique of Conant’s Wittgensteinian interpretation of Kierkegaard, see for instance: Schönbaumsfeld 2007, chap. 3, Turnbull 2012.

15 See, for instance, Davidson (2009: 7): “In contemporary European philosophy no one has analysed more in depth the Austrian thought of the 20th century – Musil, Schoenberg, Bernhard, Bachmann and, most notably, Wittgenstein. Gargani’s interpretation of Wittgenstein developed throughout his entire career constitutes a model of exegesis as well as a paradigm of how to read a philosophical work”.

turn was fostered by a long stay in Berlin, at the Wissenschaftskolleg, during the second half of the 1980's. And it was also influenced by his deep reading of some of the extreme representatives of Austrian literature of the 20th century, most notably, Thomas Bernhard. Whatever may be the evaluation of these daring experiments, they should be regarded in the light of an idea of philosophy and its practice which is consistent throughout Gargani’s trajectory. That is to say, the idea of a philosophy not intended primarily as a specialist production of theories and systems, but rather as an existential commitment to far-reaching research and self-fulfilment. From this perspective, a philosopher must, indeed, know and take advantage of all the findings and methods of a certain field, but his contribution should never only be of technical value and significance. Otherwise, philosophy would risk misplacing its main and fundamental raison d’être, contradicting the lesson of those masters, like Wittgenstein, for whom thinking about logic and his own sins was one and the same thing. And it is exactly within the framework of this way of conceiving and practicing philosophy that also the idea and significance of Gargani’s juxtaposition between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein can be better understood.

"On Kierkegaard: I represent a life for you & now see how you relate to it, whether it tempts (urges) you to live like that as well, or what other relation to it you attain. Through this representation I would like to as it were loosen up your life", Wittgenstein wrote during the ’30s (MOT: 83). The reference to Kierkegaard appears many times in Wittgenstein’s notes and the complex, multifaceted connection between these two thinkers has been widely explored and analysed in recent literature. According to M. O’Connor Drury,

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18 See, for instance, Wittgenstein MOT: “My conscience plagues me & won’t let me work. I have been reading in the works of Kierkegaard & that unsettled me even more than I already was” (175; 13.2.1937); “Few things are so difficult for me as modesty. Now I am noticing this again as I read in Kierkegaard” (185; 18.2.1937); “The one who is pure has a hardness which is tough to bear. This is why one accepts the admonitions of a Dostoevsky more easily than those of a Kierkegaard. One of them is still squeezing while the other is already cutting” (213; 24.2.1937); “It is interesting how wrong Spengler, who usually has much judgement, is in his evaluation of Kierkegaard. Here is one who is too great for him & stands too close, he only sees ‘the giant’s boots’”. (219; 6.3.1937). There are also perplexed or dubious entries: “There is something teasing about Kierkegaard’s writings & that is intended, of course (…) And yet there is something in me that condemns this teasing” (131). On the presence of Kierkegaard in the Denkbewegungen: Fremstedal 2006. Cf. also: Schönbaumsfeld 2007, chap. I, §2.
19 Among recent English literature that, in different ways, investigate commonalities and differences between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, see, for instance, Creegan 1989, Conant 1989 and 1993,
Wittgenstein would have seen Kierkegaard as “by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint”. In Wittgenstein’s opinion Kierkegaard was, among other things, deeply aware of the human “urge to thrust against the limits of language”: an impulse considered by the Austrian philosopher to be one of the most prominent aspects of human conduct. However, Gargani’s attention here is neither primarily directed at textual or documentary evidence, nor does he focus on the philological analysis of the factual influence of Kierkegaard on Wittgenstein. His aim is not even simply to compare and bring together Wittgenstein’s and Kierkegaard’s perspective on religious experience, Christianity, or the relationship between philosophy and faith (that is, obviously, a very relevant aspect in their connection). Rather, Gargani tries to let a way of conceiving and practicing philosophy emerge, by means of Kierkegaard’s and Wittgenstein’s texts, which he himself favours. This is perhaps one of the main reasons for the interest Gargani shows here for Kierkegaard, while in general he is not one of the authors whose name recurs most frequently in his writings. And this is probably also what prompted him to compare Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. As Gargani writes at the beginning of his essay: “both philosophers understand philosophical inquiry not in terms of a theory but as an activity in which the mode of exposition is crucial”. What is relevant, thus, is the fact that both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein seem to share the conviction that philosophy should be understood as a way of digging into oneself and in one’s world vision, more than as a professional construction of theoretical systems. Philosophy, even by means of an effective style of writing, should attempt to make the reader free from “the confusion with which he lives”, from the illusions and hallucinations of thought, from abuses and misuses nested in our linguistic practice (as the one that occurs when people mix Christianity up with Christendom). Philoso-


Drury 1984: 87.

“...limits of language. Kierkegaard, too, recognized this thrust and even described it in much the same way (as a thrust against paradox). This thrust against the limits of language is ethics” (Waismann 1965: 13); dated: Monday, 30 December 1929 (at Schlick’s). This passage is reported also by Gargani (infra: 212).

Gargani, infra: 199. And Creegan (1989: 104) noted: “Kierkegaard’s and Wittgenstein’s concern with methodology is an expression of the fundamental difference in their conception of philosophy. The idea of philosophy against which they are reacting is that of the search for foundations and the construction of a unified understanding of the world. Metaphysical concerns are central to such a philosophical system”.

Gargani, infra: 204; on this aspect cf.: Schönbaumsfeld 2007, chapter II. See also: Piazzesi 2009, esp. chapter III.
phy, then, aims to awaken the reader, to increase in him the awareness of his own existence, and to liberate him (as far as possible) from misunderstandings and idols that are typical of these stages and of these forms of life (or of these disciplines) where words and thoughts go round in circles. From this perspective, we may easily understand why for Gargani it is so important to highlight that “for Kierkegaard as well as Wittgenstein, it is about the conversion of concepts from a doctrinal level to the practical-logical level of their content as experienced in life” (Gargani, infra: 208), and how both of them, in his opinion, get involved in the paradoxical and provisional task “of describing and explaining what in principle should not be described nor explained” (Gargani, infra: 213). In these two philosophers, philosophical research thus becomes primarily an attempt “to find a truth which is truth for me”, using Kierkegaard’s words. This does not express a kind of down-market relativism, but rather the deep persuasion of these authors that truth may result in being useless if it does not shake and transform life, if it is not, above all, an instrument for orienting one’s own life, a way to construct a significant framework wherein a person may eventually flourish and act. In the light of these assumptions about truth, some resemblances between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein become more relevant and perspicuous, when they refuse to see Christianity essentially as a doctrine, or a corpus of theories. They put the practical, existential character of faith first, understanding the latter in terms of a choice, a leap, a way of life, and the like. And this is the reason way, as Gargani writes: “as this experiences becomes condensed and crystallizes in an objective impersonal content, it loses its religious significance” (infra: 201). Accordingly, both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein – albeit each with his own peculiar arguments and style – seem to want to make Christianity free from the (over)burden of those philosophical systems that have been erected upon it, or in the name of it. And while Kierkegaard tried to show why and in what respect “Philosophy and Christianity can never be united” (J: 25), Wittgenstein, with his distinctive radicalism, directly noticed: “If Christianity is the

24 “And what use would it be in this respect if I were to discover a so-called objective truth, or if I worked my way through the philosophers’ systems and were able to call them all to account on request, point out inconsistencies in every single circle? And what use would it be in that respect to be able to work out a theory of the state, and put all the pieces from so many places into one whole, construct a world which, again, I myself did not inhabit but merely held up for others to see? [...] What use would it be if the truth were to stand before me, cold and naked, not caring whether I acknowledge it or not, and inducing an anxious shudder rather than trusting devotion? [...] That’s what I like for leading a completely human life and not just a life of knowledge, to avoid basing my mind’s development on – yes, on something that people call objective – something which at any rate isn’t my own, and to base it instead on something which is bound up with the deepest roots of my existence” (Kierkegaard J: 19-21; 1° Aug. 1835). See also: Rocca 2012: 81-82.
It may also be worth pointing out here the essential role played in Kierkegaard’s philosophy by the reflection on possibility and his effort to illuminate how each person’s existence is marked by possibility (whether each individual is actually aware of this fact or not). Possibility also means that all aspects of life, every decision and encounter, every ‘yes’ or ‘no’, every action or omission, every gain and loss have the mark of a radical contingency, and if they are possible, this means that they might be as well as not be. This contributes to the relentless exposure of our lives to the shadow and threat of anxiety. It is no coincidence that, in the final pages of The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard/Haufniensis sketches the outlines of the “disciple of possibility”, that is to say, the man who learns to deal with the character of possibility inherent in our existence through the experience of living anxiety in the right way. Only a few people can really muster the courage to face up to anxiety, this shadow and vertigo of human freedom, but they have in return a new way of seeing:

Take the disciple of possibility, place him in the middle of the Jutland heath, where nothing happens, or where the biggest event is a grouse noisily taking wing, and he experiences everything more perfectly, more accurately, more thoroughly than someone who was applauded on the stage of world history, that is, if he was not yet formed by possibility (Kierkegaard CA: 193).

I think that, all distinctions considered, a deep awareness of possibility, or, better, what has been labelled “the sense of possibility” played a crucial role throughout all of Aldo Giorgio Gargani’s philosophical work.

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Behind the ideas, arguments and proposals – even the more technical ones – of some philosophers there is a personal pre-philosophical intuition, not ever made explicit, but that is always an irreplaceable source of thought to each of

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25 Wittgenstein 1980: 83e (1949). And he had observed before: “Christianity is not a doctrine [Lehre], not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life” (1980: 28e; 1937); while speaking of predestination he wrote: “Predestination: It is only permissible to write like this out of the most dreadful suffering – and then it means something quite different. But for the same reason it is not permissible for someone to assert it as a truth, unless he himself says it in torment – It simply isn’t a theory – Or, to put it another way: if this is truth, it is not the truth that seems at first sight to be expressed by these words. It’s less a theory then a sigh, or a cry” (1980: 30e; in the essay presented here Gargani also refers to this passage, see: infra: 201).

26 See also: Rocca 2012, chap. 6.
them. I believe that for Gargani this intuition, this reflexive experience capable of enhancing his thought was probably the one connected to the dimension of possibility, to the depth and pervasiveness of this category. This obviously expresses the fact that each life is invariably, in each moment, exposed to different, possible courses of events. And this also includes an awareness of the radical contingency and instability even of those aspects of our lives with which we are more inclined to identify ourselves, which in our private wishful thinking we depict as the necessary and irreversible grounds of our story. But, at the same time, I believe that this importance of the category of possibility should be reconnected to Gargani’s very profound “awareness of the variety of the possible versions of the world” (2004: 207), to his deep faith in the importance of experiencing and promoting many alternative stances and points of view. And, on the other hand, it also reflects he receptivity of his thought to the chances and the frictions that emerge from the contingencies of each existence, from the “inroads that life makes”, to ensure that a man chooses, wants and constructs his own interpretation of the world, among the many theoretically possible and legitimate ones: that is to say, the one by virtue of which he becomes what he is, or, at least, he steps out of the “reign of indiffent possibilities”, and he may “be able to breathe once again” (Gargani 1990a:x).

Gargani thus adamantly rejected the idea that only one correct way of seeing things exists, and that only one account of them may correspond to a supposed established reality, which lies out there, pre-packaged and unambiguous. This perspective, in his opinion, would leave to our intelligence simply the role of acknowledging the only one representation of things that fits with reality, and that, for this very reason would result in being, at the same time, a perfectly exact product and a perfectly worthless duplicate of the world. Every stance of this kind struck Gargani as invariably narrow-minded and misleading, depending on what he judged to be an imaginary dualism between a (supposed) immaculate empirical content, on the one hand, and a (supposed) attitude of our minds to mirror and reproduce in words this content, on the other. Gargani was then inclined to hold in high esteem those ideas in philosophy of language that have contributed to transcending the traditional conception of meaning, and to dissolving what Quine defined as “the myth of the museum”.

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27 We may find here a lesson already present in Wittgenstein: “I find it important in philosophizing to keep changing my posture, not to stand for too long on one leg, so as not to get stiff” (1980: 27c).

28 Gargani also noted: “It is counterintuitive to work hard for something which is merely one more version of the world to be added to the existing ones. It seems that a friction, a comeback to the ground of friction is necessary in order to produce exactly the kind of things which philosophers label versions of the world, paradigms of vision or conceptual schemes” (1993: 44).

29 “Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the
that is to say, the model according to which “words are related to things in the same manner as labels and identification cards tag the objects of a museum” (Gargani 2004: 202).

Gargani repeatedly highlighted, in many ways, the idea of breaking with the old correspondentist models of truth and knowledge, and also every understanding of the latter “in terms of reflecting, mimetic, iconic images of the internal as well as external experience of reality” (Gargani 2007: 69). And this conviction, according to which “the statement is not ‘about’ the fact, because the fact is the statement. Statement and fact are constituted for each other”, also explains why Gargani was interested in notions such as use, inference, pragmatic, gesture, praxis, construction, and form of life.

It is possible to disagree with this approach, or with some specific features of Gargani’s formulation of it, but we would not understand Gargani’s thought if we regarded it simply as a technical, professional contribution to the specialized field of philosophy of language. It was also, and perhaps primarily, a broader and more fundamental stance: a personal commitment to oppose ways of understanding language, knowledge and truth which, in his opinion, remain unrelated to the dynamics of real life, frustrating human flourishing. Besides, from his point of view, they would also conceal from our eyes plenty of stories, languages, forms of life and possibilities which are open to each person, if only he has the courage to step out of the comforting net of epistemological mythologies, idols and fetishes.

One could say, according to Gargani, that thought does not have the task of reflecting and replicating the world, but rather that of letting it become more inhabitable to us, that is to say, the task of allowing each of us to construct the interpretation of the world where he/she finds and recognizes himself/herself, or to which he/she was destined, given the vicissitudes of his/her life (cf.: 1993, chap. 3). In conclusion, it seems that one of the most distinctive features of Gargani’s philosophical work lies in what Robert Musil (the other author Gargani read throughout his life) called “the sense of possibility”:

Whoever has it does not say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, will happen, must happen; but he invents: Here this or that might, could, or ought to happen. If he is told that something is the way it is, he will think: Well, it could probably just as words are labels. To switch languages is to change the labels” (Quine 1968: 186).

30 “The image, as an identification of an idea with the world, constitutes (...) the very stagnation, the lethal palsy of thought; it represents the theft of those alternative possibilities on the swinging of which thought itself leans, inasmuch as it exists against facts” (Gargani 1990a: 16; 2001: 35).

31 Gargani 2007: 70. Gargani is here inspired by Strawson TR, § 2.

32 Like Wittgenstein, Gargani also believed that “metaphysical illusions, mythologies do not spring from an intellectual source, but are rather rooted in feelings and will” (Gargani, infra: 205).
well be otherwise. So the sense of possibility could be defined outright as the ability to conceive of everything there might be just as well, and to attach no more importance to what is than to what is not’ (MWQ: 10-11).33

It is not by chance that the theme of possibility, in connection with Wittgenstein, was again the focus of one of his last essays that was published: *Wittgenstein: la filosofia come analisi delle possibilità* (2008d: Wittgenstein: philosophy as analysis of possibilities). We may thus argue that Gargani’s thought was truly able to articulate and develop the conceptual depth and the philosophical consequences of this intuition about the role of possibility in human life (in whatever way we may assess it). And to this end he was able to mobilize an astonishing panoply of authors, topics, disciplines, writing styles and different kinds of arguments.

For this reason, too, it would be wrong and reductive to evaluate this long rich and personal experience of research by simply considering how many definitive statements and unquestionable conclusions or historiographical novelties we find in his writings. But they are significant only as long as they contribute to restoring the traces, the pattern and the memory of a philosophical path, the elegance, the courage and the freedom of a way of thinking which did not shirk from the elusiveness and subtlety of the wind:

Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a beldam’s hand in Argos or Julius Caesar not been knifed to death. They are not to be thought away. Time has branded them and fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they have ousted. But can those have been possible seeing that they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass? Weave, weaver of the wind (Joyce U: 30).

References


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33 Precisely this quotation was chosen by Gargani as the *exergum* for one of his most relevant books: *Il sapere senza fondamenti*. 
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Carlo Gabbani
c.gabbani@tiscali.it